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Abstract
This dissertation attempts to make a contribution within the fields of distributed systems, security, and formal verification. We provide a way to formally assess the impact of a given change in
three different contexts. We have developed a logic based on Lewis’s Counterfactual Logic. First
we show how our approach is applied to a standard sequential programming setting. Then, we
show how a modified version of the logic can be used in the context of reactive systems and sensor
networks. Last but not least we show how this logic can be used in the context of security systems.
Traditionally, change impact analysis has been viewed as an area in traditional software engineering. Software artifacts (source code, usually) are modified in response to a change in user
requirements. Aside from making sure that the changes are inherently correct (testing and verification), programmers (software engineers) need to make sure that the introduced changes are
coherent with those parts of the systems that were not affected by the artifact modification. The
latter is generally achieved by establishing a dependency relation between software artifacts. In
rough lines, the process of change management consists of projecting the transitive closure of the
this dependency relation based on the set of artifacts that have actually changed and assessing how
the related artifacts changed.
The latter description of the traditional change management process generally occurs after the
affected artifacts are changed. Undesired secondary effects are usually found during the testing
phase after the changes have been incorporated. In cases when there is certain level of criticality,
there is always a division between production and development environments. Change management (either automatic, tool driven, or completely manually done) can introduce extraneous defects into any of the changed software life-cycle artifacts. The testing phase tries to eradicate a
relatively large portion of the undesired defects introduced by change. However, traditional testing

viii

techniques are limited by their coverage strength. Therefore, even when maximum coverage is
guaranteed there is always the non-zero probability of having secondary effects prior to a change.

ix

Chapter 1
Introduction

For Mission Critical Systems (MCS) applications, requirements dynamically change in a rapid,
unpredictable, and continuous fashion. In applications such as those driving search and rescue
missions, any operational expansion/contraction requires that systems be updated with minimum
occurrence of secondary effects. For these application scenarios, any additional downtime resulting
from upgrade of the control system leads to unacceptable disruption of service. As a result, being
able to change these systems while preserving the correctness of both the changed and un-changed
portions is very important. We need to develop techniques, tools, and methods that allow software
engineers to specify change based on changing requirements; also, these methods and tools should
be able to guarantee the correctness of the changes and the whole system after such changes have
been applied.
Traditional software development methodologies assume that requirements are well understood
and available, in the form of a formal or extensive specification, of the required system behavior.
However, this assumption fails to hold for software that is meant to control MCS applications
deployed in rapidly evolving scenarios. While it is possible to develop logically precise requirements for software computing mathematical functions, the behavior of a software system depends
on extraneous factors that are not usually foreseen during its development. These include factors
such as platform of deployment (e.g., the word length of the machine on which the software is
run), the communication protocols used, the amount of memory available, etc. In software solving
real world problems, such extraneous factors are compounded by those from the system’s physical
environment that expect the software to cope with changing business constraints. In some cases,
given time and money, it is possible to get the original developers to update the software to meet
the changed business requirements. However, updating the system through traditional methods
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which consist in changing the code and then testing may introduce undesirable secondary effects.
In these situations, the system must be phased out with millions of dollars in software development
cost wasted.

1.1

Problem Statement

Conventional approaches used in industry cope very poorly with an scenario in which software
requirements change rapidly and constantly. Traditional testing approaches operate by first changing the system’s source code (hopefully within a development environment separated from the live
production environment), testing the changed system’s modified fragments; testing the whole system in conjunction with the changed modules and committing the change. However, even the most
robust testing procedures/methodologies are constrained by the coverage limit (citation). Even for
relatively simple programs, it is not easy to foresee the impact of change without first changing
the source code. It follows that for larger code bases (several thousands or millions of KLOC),
the problem is amplified further especially if we take into account that systems of such dimensions
tend to support critical operations. Since the state of the art (traditional change management within
Software Engineering) does not provide a way in which we could foresee the effect of a change
without incorporating the changed artifacts, we are in need of tools, processes, and methodologies
by which the latter may be achieved.
In large software projects with dynamically changing requirements are usually encountered
in the development of MCS applications, instead of manually performing development iterations
every time a requirement changes, we need to implement techniques and strategies for automatic
incremental update of system or subsystem components comprising the deployed software, in response to changing requirements. We need a requirements engineering paradigm that can give an
idea on how the changes would affect the system in an a-priori manner.

2

Chapter 2
Related Work

The theory of counterfactuals allows us to reason about hypothetical situations. It has been used
in Philosophy, Probability Theory, and Econometrics [34] for decision making in a hypothetical
environment. In Physics, it has been used for reasoning about measurements in quantum mechanics
[47], [33]. The main idea exposed by Fisler et al. in [14] is to gain knowledge regarding the effects
of changing access control policies before actually making such changes. The work of Fisler
et al. is similar to the one presented in this paper as it tries to find the effects of a change a
priori. The work of Chockler et al. in [9] employs counterfactual reasoning also in the context of
model checking. In this instance, the authors emphasize their work in coverage issues. They use
counterfactual reasoning to enhance the coverage information. This work differs from ours given
that they use counterfactual logic to explore alternative scenarios whereas, in our case, we explore
a single alternative version given an initial version.
Also, in [18], Groce et al. use counterfactual theory to detect failures, isolate errors, and aid in
repairing modifications of program code in the context of model checking. They construct a model
of program executions and establish a metric among them. This metric lets them analyze faulty
executions by examining those executions which lie at some distance from a given faulty execution.
The work of [18] relates to ours in the sense that the authors define a notion of distance among
possible execution traces in the same sense we implicitly define the number of transformation
steps between program versions. In [18], however, the authors go beyond just defining a notion
of proximity and actually define, given a system execution trace, the set of neighboring traces
whereas our work only characterizes a single future version, given an initial actual version of some
program. The work of Ren et al. in [40] exposes a tool (i.e. Chianti) that analyzes two different
versions of a given program and a set of test cases for such program and determines which tests are

3

affected due to the changes that lead from one version to another. Furthermore, for each affected
test, the tool determines a set of method-level changes that most probably affected the test. The
work presented in this article differs from the work in [40] in the sense that we do not require a
second version and a set of test cases. Our approach just needs the changes to be expressed in
our logical calculus. The correctness that pertains to the changes is decided based on the current
properties of the original program and the desired future properties.
The approach given by Guo et al. in [19] exhibits a method by which change impact analysis
is modeled and verified in a distributed setting. This approach is based on model checking. Their
model is in essence a network of state machines that communicate either via shared variables
or queues. Changes are modeled as adding and/or deleting transitions from the composite state
machine that represents the distributed system. The work in [19] is similar to ours in the context of
two aspects: 1) the authors are formally representing change in a system; however, their approach
targets distributed computations and is based on model checking whereas our approach targets
sequential computation and it is based on theorem proving; 2) this approach prunes the global state
space by using partial order reduction in order to infer the valid transitions when a change occurs;
our approach deals with change at the source code level and the validity of the change is inferred
by our logical calculus. In [50], Subramaniam et al. enhance the approach shown in [19]. The
changes are still represented by adding and/or deleting transitions of a composite state machine.
However, this work addresses the issue of test suite coverage when changes occur. This approach
detects the affected tests based on whether or not these include the affected transitions. Using
formal verification techniques similar to the ones presented in [19], the authors are able to reduce
the total regression test suite based on which tests are relevant after a given change. Our approach
goes in a different direction by formally characterizing the source code-change and determining if
the changes to the current source code version are logically consistent with its properties and the
future desired properties.
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The work presented in [38] uses symbolic execution to establish whether or not too source
code versions are equivalent. In the negative case the proposed approach generates the deltas
which characterize the input values that induce the behavior difference between the two versions.
Our approach, being based on proof theoretic method, relies mostly on the syntactic nature of
change and hence we consider two versions identical as long as they have equivalent logical characterizations. The latter also means that we are only interested on cases where our two versions
(the actual and the potential version) are logically different.
Significant research has been performed in massively distributed environment-aware computing (also known as “swarm computing” [13], [30]), in particular for creating and reasoning about
swarm programs. Most of these works have been focused on developing programming paradigms,
tools, and languages for swarm computing. EnviroTrack [1], an object-based distributed middleware system, raises the level of programming abstraction for distributed s by providing a convenient and powerful interface to the application developer geared towards tracking the physical
environment. Menezes et al. [30] study different abstractions in the field of swarms. However,
none of these works are concerned with the problem of developing formal methods for building
sensor-based systems that provide provable guarantees of meeting their requirements.
Roemer et. al. [42] survey middleware challenges in the area of wireless sensor networks.
According to [42], adaptability and data-centric communication should be important issues in coordinating services in networks that involve wireless sensors. We augment the desirable properties
of coordination frameworks for wireless sensor networks stated in [42] with the capability of intelligent data/service fusion.
The work shown in [11] uses Datalog rules to express security policies. Their approach is based
on model checking. The model used is a composite state machine. The states in this automaton
are relational structures and the transitions are labeled by events and policy rules. The transitions
of this automaton are restricted to be those that preserve the security policy’s integrity (i.e. avoid a
security breach). Furthermore, their approach requires two policies as inputs. To replace a security
5

policy, the old and the new policies need to be linked by the policy containment relationship which
amounts to the new policy subsuming the decisions that pertain to the old one. The semantics
for our agent-based networks are also based on security automatons whose transitions formally
guarantee that security and safety properties are respected. Additionally, our approach does not
require two versions of the access control matrix. Instead, we express the new version in terms of
the desired changes. Besides, while this approach heavily relies on model theory, ours is mainly
proof-theoretical. It is widely known that the size of the model is a decisive factor when considering
the space-efficiency of model-checking. In many real-world systems the size of the model may be
so large a model-checking-based approach may turn out to be prohibitive.
Ginsberg [15] pioneered the application of counterfactuals for reasoning about change in Artificial Intelligence. In particular, [15] applies the logic of counterfactuals to hardware design
problems. Our work, however, deals with reasoning about change in terms of security and safety
in sensor networks where arbitrary changes can compromise the system.
The approach followed in [10] targets large customized Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP)
systems. They analyze two different customization code versions. They apply static analysis in the
form of program slicing to examine two subsequent code versions. The change impact is denoted
by the difference in the outputs when the two versions are analyzed using a given set of inputs,
i.e., there is a change if the two versions are not observationally equivalent. This approach, similar
to the work reviewed in the previous paragraphs, still requires two different versions. Although
this approach is clearly applicable to large scale ERP systems, it lacks the ability to manipulate
a representation of the source code (security model in our case) and deduce whether or not there
would be a security breach if the changes were incorporated.
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Chapter 3
Literature Review

Zhang, Ji; Cheng, Betty H.C. “Model-Based Development of Dynamically Adaptive Software”.
Proceedings of the International Conference of Software Engineering (ICSE’06) 2006. pp. 371380. [54]
The authors propose an approach for dynamic software update which could be described as
generic. This approach’s contribution consists on regarding the dynamic update problem from a
multi-threaded perspective. After all, in conventional software development, it is the integrated
effort of a team of programmers that serves the purpose when a software system needs to undergo
any sort of non-trivial modification.
Other interesting characteristics of this approach rely on the fact that it permits dynamic update
while maintaining current system state, while other approaches (those based on process-algebraic
methods) are not capable of achieving this. The latter is related to the fact that, according to the
authors, other techniques tend to conceive the dynamic update problem from a structural perspective; the latter may not be so useful, given that dynamic update mechanisms should strive for
transparency.
Zhang, Ji; Cheng, Betty H.C. “Specifying Adaptation Semantics” Workshop on Algorithms and
Data Structures (WADS’05) 2005. pp. 1-6. [53]
In this paper, the authors present a specification language based on linear temporal logic. They
characterize the system states in which updates can be performed as mutually consistent assertions
in temporal logic. Also, the authors introduce a graph based complementary technique in order to
make their approach more understandable in practice.
Although effective, their approach may be considered as not entirely efficient, due to the fact
that the algorithms that undertake the verification of their models have exponential complexity.
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Kogekar. S., Neema, S. et al.“Constraint-Guided Dynamic Reconfiguration in Sensor Networks”
Proceedings of the International Conference on Information Processing in Sensor Networks (IPSN’04)
2004. pp. 379-387. [26]
This article presents an approach by which sensor network - based software can be dynamically
adapted. The authors use a technique by which they can characterize the operation environment
(all allowed values for the control parameters) as formal constraints.
System states are represented as specific points within the operation space and reconfiguration
or dynamic update is regarded as transitions along those points. Thus, software update is regarded
as the exploration of the operation space; given the nature of the parameters for these types of
systems (Sensor Networks) and without adequate heuristics, this problem may imply some level
of combinatorial explosion.
Poizat, P., Salan, G. and Tivoli, M. “On Dynamic Reconfiguration of Behavioral Adaptations.
Proceedings of the 3rd International Workshop on Coordination and Adaptation Techniques for
Software Entities (WCAT’06) 2006. pp. 61-69. [39]
This article considers the problem of dynamic update from an additive perspective. Modifications on the software system will be done by integrating software components called ”adaptors”
whose behavior will change based on changes in the set of requirements. The specific role of the
adaptors is to modify the interfaces exposed by system modules.
The authors also discuss an important concept in the realm of dynamic update, they denominate
it the silent behavior portion. By the latter they mean that, in the face of a change in the system
specification, the system part(s) which suffer(s) the change should be isolated and stopped. The
latter partially guarantees that, after the update, the system invariants will still be consistent.
Stoyle, G., Hicks, M. “Mutatis Mutandis: Safe and Predictable Dynamic Software Updating”.
Symposium on Principles of Programming Languages (POPL’05) 2005. pp. 183-189. [49]
In this article, the authors consider the problem of dynamic update from a type theoretical
perspective. The authors develop a calculus-based formalism (Proteus) which characterizes the
changes in software behavior as changes in the types in a function signature. The change is char-
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acterize by a set of type transformer functions, by which, explicit use of some changed data type
are casted into the modified data type.
Taenzer, G., Goedicke, M., et al. “Dynamic Accommodation of Change: Automated Architecture Configuration of Distributed Systems.” 14th International IEEE Conference on Automated
Software Engineering. (ASE’99) 1999. pp. 287-291. [51]
In this article, the authors present an approach by which, module interfaces are modified via
graph transformation methods. Dynamic update, thus, is modeled as sequence of graph transformations where a particular graph represents the current or potential state of a give distributed
system.
One of the major contributions regarding this paper is the definition of a quiescent state. In
order to apply an update to some set of modules within a software system, all of its components
(nodes) must be in a consistent state and all communication should have been suspended. It is only
under these conditions that the dynamic update is guaranteed not to violate the system’s invariants.
Shen, j., Xi, S,. Huang, G. Jiao, W., et al. “Towards a Unified Formal Model for Supporting Mechanisms of Dynamic Component Update”. 4th Joint Meeting of the European Software Engineering
Conference and the Symposium of the Foundations of Software Engineering. (ESEC-FSE’05)
2005. pp. 80-89. [46]
In this article, the authors try to envisage the dynamic update problem from a software-architectural
point of view. Their solution to the problem is realized as a special kind of connector; where the
idea of connector is directly borrowed from the work by Shaw and Garland. Concurrently, the authors try to abstract their approach from any platform/hardware-dependent issues; hence, they define the behavioral dynamics of their approach using CSP (Communicating Sequential Processes).
One particular aspect about this approach is the authors’ intention to make a case about the
feasibility of it based on real application to well-known distributed systems frameworks, namely,
CORBA and J2EE. They also consider how to apply their approach to a web services-based architecture. A common underlying issue in these three separate cases was the problem of maintaining
and transferring state when updating the system.
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Batista, T., Rodrguez, N. “Dynamic Reconfiguration of Component-Based Applications.” Proceedings of the International Symposium on Software Engineering for Parallel and Distributed
Systems (PDSE’00) 2000. pp 32-39. [3]
In the context of this article the authors put the runtime emphasis on dynamic update. This
approach relies on the dynamic nature of interpreted languages in order to achieve automatic system reconfiguration. According to the authors, the main reason for using an interpreted language to
achieve this is because doing so will eliminate the need for compilation phases in between software
updates.
This approach also relies on the CORBA standard to guarantee distributed model encapsulation
via the separation between interface and specification. It also achieves dynamic update due to a
characteristic inherent to the CORBA standard; this characteristic consists on partially-expressive
interfaces. Given that interfaces are not strongly expressed, behavioral variations are determined
by characterization of the type of messages that the modules use to communicate; functionality is
thus determined at runtime which smoothly implies dynamic update capabilities.
Chen, W., Hiltunen, M., Schlitchting, R. “Constructing Adaptive Software in Distributed Systems.”
Proceedings of the 21st International Conference on Distributed Computer Systems (ICDCS’01)
2001. pp. 413-420. [8]
This article situates the problem of dynamic update within the realm of sensor networks. Similar to other approaches, it conceptualizes the dynamic update problem as a finite sequence of state
transitions. The state space is denominated as the operation space. Given that system requirements
are characterized as all the possible values of the operational parameters, the operation space is
the feasible zone determined by the union of all constraints induced by the legal values of all
operational parameters.
Thus, the set of all possible configurations is modeled as the set of system components (modules) and their alternative configurations along with the relationships among modules. The latter
intuitively indicates that the dynamic update process is plagued with inefficiency due a combinatorial explosion derived from all the possible configurations available in the operation space.
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Gupta, D,. Jalote, P. And Barua G. A Formal Framework for On-Line Software Version Change.
IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering. Volume 22, Issue2. 1996. pp. 120-131. [20]
This article exposes the dynamic update problem from a software version change perspective.
Hence, dynamic update is achieved, by source code substitution at run-time. The authors assume
the existence of correct source code version before and after the change. This approach, although
dated, elaborates a very illustrative model that deals with two important aspects in dynamic update:
overall correctness and consistent state transitions. Also, the authors suggest other important issues
such as quiescent state of the system when the update process is being executed.
One particular issue of this approach is that it relies on an imperative programming scheme to
model the dynamic update process. Also, the scope for this approach does not go beyond a standalone sequential setting, where a centralized processor and the idea of global time can be relied on.
They succinctly suggest that their approach could be extended to a distributed setting. However,
as it is shown in standard distributed system literature, just the idea of a consistent distributed state
is somewhat complicated to achieve.
The authors emphasize on the fact of the instrumentality of the module invariant. Which they
define as the set of conditions with denote the state in which is safe to a modification on the system.
This approach relies on the programmer to specify this invariant.
Bierman, G., Hicks, M. et al. “Formalizing Dynamic Software Updating”. In Proceedings of the
2nd International Workshop on Unanticipated Software Evolution (IWUSE’03) 2003. pp. 1-17. [7]
This article presents and approach that strives to present a solution to the dynamic update
problem via a λ Calculus-based method. Their main motif is to provide an update mechanism
which, aside from being simple provides precise mathematical semantics.
Their approach implies a two-fold methodology. In one aspect they provide the syntax of their
update calculus; which, according to the authors is a first order, simply-typed, call-by-value lambda
calculus. The other side of their approach is the semantics, which is composed of a set of reduction
rules whose purpose is to realize an expression transformation mechanism.
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The authors justify their approach by asserting that it follows two principles which ultimately
guarantee correctness: Type Safety by use the module wide signature (the set of types of the
module’s public members) they can implement a subtype operator to distinguish between different
module versions at runtime. The other principle is Correctness and this one is weakly justified
given that the authors assert that when an update happens, the updating actions are not initiated
while ongoing computations are active; however, this is asserted by way of an example. Also,
they justify that the latter case is a rough approximation to a Hoare-based scheme, in which a
mechanism of pre and post conditions is used to guarantee consistencies across updates.
Zhang, S., Huang L. “Formalizing Class Dynamic Software Updating”. In Proceedings of the 6th
International Conference on Quality Software (QSIC’06) 2006. pp. 403-409. [55]
This article shows the type theoretical side of dynamic update problem and also emphasizes
on the object oriented aspect of it. The authors assert that although some approaches deal with
the dynamic software update (DSU) problem from an object oriented point of view. These approaches still lack an adequate degree of rigor and hence their type safety cannot be objectively
characterized.
Given that the objective of this approach is rigor, the authors show that their solution is adequate via a calculus for the DSU problem. Their result section is a set proofs (theorems and their
correspondent lemmas) on the consistency induced by each and one of their type judgments (assertions in the form of theorems proper of type theory). Their approach emphasizes on type safety
and thus, the proofs shown in the article are instrumental for the validity of their approach.
An interesting twist shown in this approach is the use of FeatherWeight Java [24]. According
to the references FWJ is a reduced version of the JAVA programming language; and its purpose
rests on making type theoretical proof about JAVA programs in an easy manner.
Duggan D. “Type-Based Hot Swapping of Running Modules”. In Proceedings of the International
Conference on Functional Programming (ICFP’01) 2001. pp. 62-73. [12]
In this article, the authors expose an approach which conceptually takes advantage of the majority of existing object oriented languages. The main contribution of this article is the novel use
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of reflection capability on a given language to realize what they call Hot Swapping; which is defined as changing the implementation of a given module and have it be transparent to its respective
clients.
This article improves on an approach which establishes isomorphism between old types and
new types. This scheme is based on the co-existence of instances of the new and old types as
a result of a modification on the types of formal parameters, a return type for a function or, in
general, the interface of a given module. Their contribution is based on considering an equivalence
relation between the old type and the new type which differs from the referred approach in that a
subtype relationship is not symmetric while the equivalence is.
This approach requires the existence of a pair of isomorphisms (structure-preserving transformations) between the old and new type and hence, a way to implement the coexistence of corresponding types in an update. More precisely, if a type isomorphism can be constructed the types
are structurally equivalent and hence an instance of one may be an instance of the other.
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Chapter 4
Code-Change Impact Analysis Using Counterfactuals

4.1

Introduction

In this chapter we present a framework for what-if analysis of programs based on Lewis’ theory
of counterfactuals [29]. The framework can be used to statically perform change-impact analysis
for source code. It enables us to verify assertions about a changed version of the program without actually incorporating the changes. We present a logical calculus that precisely characterizes
structural modifications to source code and their impact on the behavior of the program.1
In the software development life-cycle, the majority of costs are usually incurred during the
testing and maintenance phase. Addition of new features, optimizations, refactoring and fixing of
defects necessitates modifications of the software system’s source code. While a combination of
formal methods and testing as it has been shown in [2], [4] can lead towards a defect-free software,
aggressive optimizations and other modifications can undo the quality resulting from thousands of
hours of verification and validation efforts. In many cases, such optimizations and modifications
are done without a complete understanding of the system (specially in the cases of parallel programs). Due to the complexity and size of today’s software systems, completely understanding
a system by code review is out of question. Regardless of how a programmer modifies the program, extensive regression tests are needed in order to verify that (1) the new program version still
complies with its correctness constraints and/or (2) the new version complies with the properties
implied by the new requirements. While regression tests make sure that the modified software
system passes the test cases, defects that were detected through static analysis techniques and
1

Portions of this chapter were published in:

Manuel Peralta and Supratik Mukhopadhyay. Code-Change impact analysis using counterfactuals.
Software and Applications Conference, Annual International, 0:694–699, 2011.
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Computer

subsequently removed may creep-in as a result of modifications and will remain undetected by regression tests. We need automated tool-support that enables us to understand software systems and
the effects of the changes on them; automated tools should be able to statically determine whether
a set of modifications applied to a software system resulted in modifications of its semantics.
In this chapter we present a framework for what-if analysis of programs based on Lewis’ theory
of counterfactuals [29]. The framework can be used to statically perform change-impact analysis
for source code. It enables us to verify assertions about a changed version of the program without actually incorporating the changes. We present a logical calculus that precisely characterizes
potential structural modifications to source code and their impact on the program’s behavior. Our
framework blends model theoretic verification techniques with proof theoretic ones. The space of
program versions under modifications is treated as a Kripke structure with neighborhood semantics. The completeness and soundness theorems for counterfactual logic described below are used
to transfer model theoretic facts to proof theoretic ones and vice versa. We use the expression
counterfactual logic to precisely mean propositional counterfactual logic.
One can argue that it is possible to actually apply the modifications to the program and then
statically analyze the modified program to check if it conforms to the expected behavior. However,
if we expect a certain behavior to emerge after the changes are applied and it turns out, based on
the result of static analysis, that the applied changes do not enforce the desired behavior, the entire
effort spent in modifying the code is wasted. Our framework allows a programmer to think of
alternate ways of implementing a program and prevents waste of efforts in writing code that does
not meet the objectives.

4.2

Counterfactual Theory

The logic of counterfactuals helps us reason about assertions that are not matter of fact. In [29]
Lewis provided a sound and complete proof system and proved its decidability. Based on the logic
of counterfactuals we derive a logical calculus that allows us to assert properties that would hold
15

for a future version of a given program and verify that these would indeed hold if the changes
needed to obtain that version were actually implemented.

4.2.1

The Language of Counterfactual Theory

In coherence with [29] we will briefly introduce the language regarding the logic of counterfactuals
below 2 :

φ ::= pi |¬φ|φ ∧ φ|φ ∨ φ|φ → φ|φ  φ
The counterfactual sentence φ  ψ should be read as: if it had been the case that φ, it
would have been the case that ψ. Thus, if we had an assertion whose antecedent ranged over
the properties of some given program and also the changes needed to produce a new version and
whose consequent ranged over the properties that a new version would have, then we could use
counterfactual logic to code such an assertion.

4.3

Program Transform Model

In this section we provide a formal exposition of the two-fold model we use to formalize counterfactual change. On one side (subsections: 4.3.1, 6.4.3) we introduce our the part of our logical
calculus that let us encode change at the source code level based on higher order logic. On the
other side (subsections: 7.4.4, 7.4.5 ) we provide the semantics of our approach using Lewis’
approach [29] based on neighborhood semantics of Kripke.

4.3.1

Logical Description of a Program

The programs we will be dealing with are initially well formed strings over the following syntax 3
shown in Figure 4.1.
2
3

pi denotes a propositional variable.
For the sake of brevity the non-expanded non-terminals shall be interpreted as usual.
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hStati ::= skip | hAsgStmti | hIfStmti | hLoopStmti | begin | end | else
hAsgStmti ::= hVarNamei := hIntExpi
hIfStmti ::= if hBoolExpi then begin
hLoopStmti ::= for hAsgStmti to hIntConsti do begin

Figure 4.1: Restricted grammar for our ALGOL-like language
Furthermore, we define U ⊆ N to be a prefix set of the natural numbers. Moreover, let Stat
also denote the set of strings obtained from the grammar show in Figure 4.1. Hence, we can further
define our set of well-defined programs as the following:

P = {f : U → Stat}
Any program f0 ∈ P is just a mapping from a subset of the natural numbers (which denote line
numbers) to the set of well-formed strings from the grammar in Figure 4.1. Since P is a function
space, it may contain more functions that the ones that interest us, hence it is necessary to characterize the class of functions we are interested in.

First of all, our programs need a relation among line numbers to capture the notion of nested
statements or more intuitively, the notion of matching begins and ends. For each program
f ∈ P we have a relation R ⊆ U × U such that:
1. (∀u ∈ U )f (u) = hIf Stmti or f (u) = hLoopStmti
2. (∃v ∈ U )(u < v) ∧ (f (v) = end) ∧ (u, v) ∈ R
3. (∀u, v ∈ U )(u, v) ∈ R → (w, v) 6∈ R where (∀w ∈ U )w 6= u
4. (∀u, v, w, x ∈ U )(u, v) ∈ R ∧ (u ≤ w ≤ v) ∧ (w, x) ∈ R → (x ≤ v)
Furthermore, we choose to model possible program transformations using the following rule:
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(∀u ∈ U )(u 6= ui ) ∧ (u 6= uj ) → (f (u) = f 0 (u))
∧

(f (ui ) = f 0 (uj ))

∧

(f (uj ) = f 0 (ui ))

The latter expression denotes the existence of a new program f 0 ∈ P that happens to differ
from our original program f ∈ P only by swapping two statements (i.e. ui and uj ).
4.3.2

Program Transformers

In the context of Hoare Logic the notion of predicate transformer [17] is widely known. A predicate transformer may be regarded as a first order logic formula which via existential quantifier
elimination produces the weakest precondition for a given command and its respective post condition. Following the same notion of predicate transformers we have thought of specifying our
programs and their transformations as Program Transformers.

Let ΨP denote the rules given in section 4.3.1 and let ΨS denote the rule shown below. Thence,
we can formally express our program transformer expression as:

ΨT , (∃f )(∃R)ΨP ∧ ΨS
Notice that ΨT is a second order logic formula since we are quantifying over one function
symbol and one relation symbol. Also, let us assume that we have a fixed program f0 ∈ P. By
definition, f0 is a finite list of statements in Stat. Thence, we can logically express f0 : U → Stat
by a finite conjunction of equalities as it is expressed below:

Φf ,

^

f (i) = Stati

i∈U
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Where Φf is the logical formula that represents f0 and Stati is a statement in Stat. Therefore,
we can ”apply” ΨT to Φf by joining them by conjunction which produces the following formula:

ΨT ∧ Φf , (∃f )(∃R)ΨP ∧ ΨS ∧ Φf
Also, do notice that, we may only eliminate the quantified f in the latter formula. The resulting
formula will be the logical expression that denotes our new version of f0 , namely, f 0 , however,
notice that, since we cannot eliminate the quantified variable R (as elimination of n-ary quantified
relation symbols is an open problem), the resulting expression is not quite the corresponding formula for f 0 in the same manner Φf denoted f0 .

Furthermore, notice that our notion of a relation R ⊆ U × U may be critiqued as being too
vague. To the latter we assert that for each f ∈ P R will be the least relation that satisfies ΨP .
Moreover, R’s unique characterization may be provided by the following second order logic formula:
0

0 R
0
∃R(ΨR
P ∧ (∀R ΨP ∧ (∀x, yR (x, y))

→ R(x, y)) → (∀u, vR(u, v) → R0 (u, v)))
0
Where ΨR
P denotes the same formula ΨP with R substituted for R0 . Intuitively, the latter

formula means that R is the least relation that satisfies ΨP since if there is any ohter relation R0
that also satisfies ΨP then both relations are equivalent. More simply, the latter assertion may be
formalized using set-theoretic notation, this yields a more succinct expression.

∃RR |= ΨP ∧ (∀R0 R0 |= ΨP ) ∧ (R ⊆ R0 ) → (R0 ⊆ R)
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4.3.3

Kripke Versioning Model

In [29] the author provides the semantics of his counterfactual propositional logic using a multipleworld interpretation. In that same manner we have chosen to interpret our program transformation.
In our case, each program version will represent a world. When we applied a program transformer (as it is defined in the last section) we obtain a new version. Below, we provide a formal
interpretation based on a Kripke model.
Definition 4.3.1 (Kripke Version Model) A Kripke Version Model R is a triple hP, ⇒, P0 i where:
1. P = {Pk }k∈N is the set of all n-line programs which are the different program versions.
2. P0 is the initial program.
3. ⇒⊆ P × P is a binary relation defined the set of all possible program versions. Where ⇒
is the smallest relation such that the following properties hold:
(a) si ← si , statement si is left unchanged. This stands for the do nothing transformation.
(b) si ← sj , statement sj replaces statement si , where sj ∈ Pk . We usually call this
primitive transformation, a swap.
(c) si ← sj , statement sj replaces statement si , where sj 6∈ Pk . Thence, sk is a new
statement.
(d) (∀i)si ∈ Pk can be changed only once.
Furthermore, we assume that the relation ⇒ complies with the properties of reflexivity, symmetry, and transitivity. Below, we justify each property based on the latter definition of ⇒:
1. Reflexivity: For any program Pi ∈ P, it is obvious that the do-nothing transformation will
yield that any program can be transformed into itself. Therefore, Pi ⇒ Pi given that for all
sj ∈ Pi , Pi = Pi [sj /sj ]
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2. Symmetry: For any programs Pi , Pj ∈ P any of the above transformations can be reversed
and thence, Pi ⇒ Pj implies Pj ⇒ Pi .
3. Transitivity: For any programs Pi , Pj , Pk ∈ P, applying two or more transformations to a
program will yield intermediate versions; this is equivalent to transforming the initial version
by composing the transformations into one. Thus, Pi ⇒ Pj and Pj ⇒ Pk imply that Pi ⇒+
Pk . Where ⇒+ , ⇒ ◦ ⇒n−1 and n > 1.
4.3.4

Interpreting the Counterfactual Implication

As it was stated earlier, the purpose of our model is to help interpret assertions in the language
of counterfactual logic. Let P0 denote our given source program. Also, let us assume we had a
counterfactual assertion, namely φ  ψ in which:
• φ stands for assertions regarding P0 and some transformation si ← sj that implies that
P1 = P0 [si /sj ]
• ψ stands for assertions regarding P1
Thence, following the model-theoretic interpretation proposed by Lewis in [29], our version of
the counterfactual implication is interpreted as:

R |= φ  ψ .

(4.1)

Where R denotes our previously defined Kripke Versioning Model. Moreover, letting αi , βi
denote propositional statements about the structure of Pi and Pj respectively, then, we can state
that:
φ , (

n
^

αi ) ∧ (Pi ⇒+ Pj )

i=1

ψ ,

m
^

βj

j=1
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Where ⇒+ denotes the positive/transtive closure for the relation ⇒. Furthermore, given an
initial program version, namely P0 , we produce several versions by applying one or more transformations to it. In the context of a counterfactual assertion, the properties regarding the current
version and the changes applied to it (in order to produce a new version) imply properties possessed the new version and hence:
V
R |= φ  ψ , (∃min k ∈ N)( ni=1 αi )
V
∧(P0 ⇒k P 0 ) → ( m
j=1 βj ) .
The latter should be interpreted as there exists a minimal number of transformation steps such
V
that given the properties of our initial program P0 (namely, ni=1 αi ) and the transformation between the two program versions implies the desired properties of the future program version
V
(namely, m
j=1 βj ).
4.4

Fragment of Counterfactual Logic

Since our final objective is to produce an algorithm and a tool to enable us to reason about the
properties that will hold for future versions of a given program, we need a logical calculus as a
principal enabling component which will permit us infer these properties in a mechanical manner.
Hence, we present below a proof-theoretical fragment that pertains to the logic of counterfactuals
as it is presented in [29]:
1.

φφ

Reflexivity rule

2.

φψ
Counterfactual-Elimination rule
φ→ψ

3.

`λ→ψ
Conditional Deduction rule
` (φ  λ) → (φ  ψ)

4.

` (φ → χ) ∧ (χ  ψ)
Partial Transitivity theorem
`φψ
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Notice that the last statement above is a theorem and not a rule. Hence, we are required to
present a brief proof which will assure its validity. Such proof is given below4 :
1. (φ → χ) ∧ (χ  ψ) Hypothesis
2. χ  ψ ∧-Elimination in 1
3. χ → ψ Counterfactual Elimination rule in 2
4. φ → χ ∧-Elimination in 1
5. φ → ψ Hypothetical Syllogism in 3, 4
6. (φ → ψ) → [(φ  φ) → (φ  ψ)] Conditional Deduction rule
7. (φ  φ) → (φ  ψ) Modus Ponens in 5, 6
8. φ  φ Reflexivity rule
9. φ  ψ Modus Ponens in 7, 8
10. (φ → χ) ∧ (χ  ψ) ∴ φ  ψ Conditional Proof from 1 to 9

4.5

First Example

Assume that we are provided with the simple program shown in Figure 4.2. We introduce a set of
propositions to characterize different statements of the program.

4.5.1

Program Structure Predicates

The objective of using counterfactual logic is to decide upon assertions about the properties of
potential program versions and their structure. In the context of this example, we will need propositional assertions like the ones below:
4

We saw fit to include this proof in the chapter as this theorem is not part of the work presented in [29].
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f u n c t i o n f o o ( var x : I n t e g e r ) : I n t e g e r
var
1
y : Integer := 1;
2
z : Integer := 0;
begin
3
i f x > 0 then
4
z : = 2∗ y ;
5
else
6
z : = 2∗ y + 1 ;
7
foo := z
end

Figure 4.2: Example source code
• α , f (1) = y : Integer := 1
• β , f (2) = z : Integer := 0
• γ , f (3) = if x > 0 then
• δ , f (4) = z := 2 ∗ y
•  , f (5) = else
• π , f (6) = z := 2 ∗ y + 1
• ρ , f (7) = foo := z
The latter propositions imply that we can denote a program by a conjunction of a finite number
of propositions like the ones shown above. Hence,

P0 , α ∧ β . . . ∧ ρ .

(4.2)

Potential program versions will also be denoted by conjunction of propositions about the program’s structure. Hence, a new version of P0 could be a program where γ and δ hold true. Furthermore, we can use our logical program description expression to specify the structure a new
version may have, based on a given program which, in this case, is P0 . Therefore,
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(u 6= 4) ∧ (u 6= 6) → (f (u) = f 0 (u))
∧

(f (4) = f 0 (6))

∧

(f (6) = f 0 (4))

(4.3)

Where f 0 denotes the member of P which denotes P1 our new version of P0 . Hence, P1 is the
version constructed from P0 by swapping the statements labeled by D and E. Therefore, according
to our definition for the versioning model hP, ⇒, P0 i, then P0 ⇒+ P1 . Furthermore, we can see
that the change applied to P0 may affect its behavior. Initially, from Figure 4.2, we can infer that
whenever the input is greater than 0, the output of this program is an even number and it will be an
odd number otherwise. Now, if we take P1 into account, we see that the latter is no more the case
and now it holds that if the input is greater than 0, the output is odd and it will be an even number
otherwise.5
However, the latter assertions cannot be fully accepted since they fall in one of the following
categories: 1) they are assertions regarding P0 and hence, we would have to verify its code in
order to prove them; 2) they are assertions regarding P1 and we do not have the source code for
it (although we know precisely how to transform P0 in order to get P1 ). Therefore, we can assert
that the latter still bares the question of how can we infer properties of non-existent programs? The
following sections will answer this query.

4.5.2

Counterfactual Proof

In this section we will show how to use the logic of counterfactuals as a calculus to prove the
following assertion.
Given a program P0 , if we had swapped the contents of statements D and E then it would
have been the case that whenever the input is a positive integer, then the output is an odd
integer.
For the sake of simplicity, we will employ the notation P , P 0 [si /sj ] to denote a swap in terms of program
transformers.
5
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We can see that the latter sentence is actually a counterfactual implication by definition and
thus, we can encode it in order to express it in our already-defined language. Hence, we can write
the following:

P0 ∧ swapP4,60  [(x > 0) → (2 6 |z)] .

(4.4)

where swapP4,60 stands for the proposition that denotes interchanging the lines 4 and 6 in P0 and
hence it also shortly denotes the program transformer that yields P1 from P0 . Our main objective
is to show that the latter assertion is actually a theorem in the logic of counterfactuals. In order to
do so we need the proof theoretical fragment we proposed earlier and some lemmas and theorems
we will present in the following sections.

4.5.3

Facts Based on Model Theory

Some of the assertions we will use are firmly grounded in the program versioning model we defined
earlier. Thence, let R = hP, ⇒, P0 i be the model we defined before. Thus, we claim that the
following assertions are valid in this model:
1. P0 → α ∧ β
2. (α ∧ β ∧ swapP4,60 )  γ ∧ δ
The first assertion follows trivially from the definition of P0 as a proposition based on the
structure of its source code. The second assertion is based on the fact that the future version P1 is
based on valid transformations applied to P0 , more precisely P1 , P0 [s4 /s6 ][s6 /s4 ] which implies
that P0 ⇒ P1 . Hence, we have a minimal number of transformation steps that, based on the
structure of P0 yielded the structure of P1 which in turn implies that γ ∧ δ is a true assertion. The
latter is the model theoretical justification for the second assertion above. Thence, by completeness,
the two assertions above are theorems of our counterfactual logic.
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In what follows we will divide the proof regarding the assertion (4.4) in three claims each one
representing an intermediate steps that will ultimately lead to the proof of (4.4).

4.5.4

First Claim : (δ ∧ γ) → [(x > 0) → (2 6 |z)]

Our general proof strategy is based on the Conditional Deduction rule whose deduction rule we
give below for reference purposes:
`λ→ψ
.
` (φ  λ) → (φ  ψ)

(4.5)

We provide the necessary instantiation that this case requires:

λ , γ∧δ
φ , α ∧ β ∧ swapP4,60
ψ , (x > 0) → (2 6 |z)
Hence, the next step is to prove the first claim, which in this case is (δ ∧ γ) → [(x > 0) →
(2 6 |z)]. In order to do so, let us assume that the propositions δ and γ hold true. Moreover, let us
assume that the program’s input is a positive number, i.e., x > 0. Thence we will use predicate
transformers as it is shown in [17] in order to deduce the required implication. The predicate
transformers’ rule are given below:
postA , ∃hx,y,zi (x0 = x0 ) ∧ (y 0 = y) ∧ (z 0 = z)
postB , ∃hx,y,zi (x0 = x0 ) ∧ (y 0 = y) ∧ (z 0 = 0)
postC , ∃hx,y,zi [(x > 0) ∧ (x0 = x0 ) ∧ (y 0 = y)
∧(z 0 = z)] ∨ [(x ≤ 0) ∧ (x0 = x0 ) ∧ (y 0 = 1) ∧ (z 0 = z)]
postD , ∃hx,y,zi (x0 = x0 ) ∧ (y 0 = y) ∧ (z 0 = 2y + 1)
postE , ∃hx,y,zi (x0 = x0 ) ∧ (y 0 = y) ∧ (z 0 = 2y)
postF , ∃hx,y,zi (x0 = x0 ) ∧ (y 0 = y) ∧ (z 0 = z)
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Applying the predicate transformer functions to the proposition x > 0 we get
postA (x > 0) , (x0 = x) ∧ (y 0 = 1) ∧ (z 0 = z) ∧ (x > 0)
ρ1 , (x0 > 0) ∧ (y 0 = 1)

postB (ρ1 ) , (x0 = x) ∧ (y 0 = y) ∧ (z 0 = 0)
∧(x > 0) ∧ (y 0 = 1)
ρ2 , (x0 > 0) ∧ (y 0 = 1) ∧ (z 0 = 0)

postC (ρ2 ) , (x < 0 ∨ x ≥ 0) ∧ (x0 = x) ∧ (y 0 = y)
∧(z 0 = z) ∧ (x > 0) ∧ (y = 1) ∧ (z = 0)
ρ3 , (x0 > 0) ∧ (y 0 = 1) ∧ (z 0 = 0)
postD (ρ3 ) , (x0 = x) ∧ (y 0 = y) ∧ (z 0 = 2y + 1)
∧(x > 0) ∧ (y = 1) ∧ (z = 0)
ρ4 , (x0 > 0) ∧ (y 0 = 1) ∧ (z 0 = 3)

postF (ρ4 ) , (x0 = x) ∧ (y 0 = y) ∧ (z 0 = z)
∧(x > 0) ∧ (y = 1) ∧ (z = 3)
ρ5 , (x0 > 0) ∧ (y 0 = 1) ∧ (z 0 = 3)
Thus, we have concluded that the final value for the variable z is 3 and thence, we have concluded that 2 6 |z. Since we had assumed that x > 0 then the implication (x > 0) → (2 6 |z) holds.
Furthermore, given that we first assumed that δ and γ held then (δ ∧ γ) → [(x > 0) → (2 6 |z)]. 
4.5.5

0
Second Claim : α ∧ β ∧ swapP
4,6  [(x > 0) → (2 6 |z)]

Using the first claim and the Conditional Deduction Rule, then we can assert that:
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P0
)γ∧δ
(α ∧ β ∧ swap4,6

α ∧ β ∧ swapP4,60  [(x > 0) → (2 6 |z)]

.

(4.6)

Notice that the premise of this instantiated rule already holds since it is a valid assertion in the
context of our model. Once again, by the completeness of the counterfactual logic we can use
P0
 [(x > 0) → (2 6 |z)] and
Modus Ponens and infer the required assertion, i.e. α ∧ β ∧ swap4,6

this proves the second claim. 
In order to prove this claim, we need to employ the last rule of the fragment of counterfactual
logic we proposed. We will use the partial transitivity theorem which we re-state below:
` (φ → χ) ∧ (χ  ψ)
.
`φψ

(4.7)

Notice that the first claim is what we first asserted about our intuition regarding the transformation from P0 to P1 . Based on our model R and the second claim, we can assert the following:
P0
1. (P0 ∧ swapP4,60 ) → (α ∧ β ∧ swap4,6
)

2. (α ∧ β ∧ swapP4,60 )  [(x > 0) → (2 6 |z)]
Thus, if we instantiate the variables in the latter rule like we show below:
φ , P0 ∧ swapP4,60
χ , α ∧ β ∧ swapP4,60
ψ , (x > 0) → (2 6 |z)
Therefore, we can see that, by the first two assertions and the partial transitivity theorem stated
above, then the assertion [P0 ∧ swapP4,60 ]  [(x > 0) → (2 6 |z)] holds and this proves the theorem.
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1
a : Integer := 30;
2
b : Integer := 9 − a / 5 ;
3
c , d : Integer ;
4 begin
5
c := b ∗ 4;
6
i f c > 10 t h e n
7
c := c − 10;
8
d := c ∗ ( 6 0 / a )
9 end

Figure 4.3: Source code for the second example
4.6

Second Example

In the second example, we want to prove that if a constant propagation transformation were to
be applied to a program then its semantics would have remained unchanged. Below, we show the
source code for the initial version of our program.
In order to apply a constant propagation transformation to the source code in Figure 4.3, we
define the following transformation steps:
1. Do-nothing transformation on statement 1. ∴ P1 = P0 [s1 /s1 ]
2. In statement 2, replace the RHS of the assignment with the constant value 3. ∴ P2 =
P1 [s01 /s1 ]
3. Do-nothing transformation on line C. ∴ P3 = P2 [s3 /s3 ]
4. Replace RHS of the assignment for constant value 12 on line D. ∴ P4 = P3 [s04 /s4 ]
5. Replace current boolean expression with the constant T rue in line E. ∴ P5 = P4 [s05 /s5 ]
6. Replace RHS of the assignment for constant value 2 on line F . ∴ P6 = P5 [s06 /s6 ]
7. Replace RHS of the assignment for constant value 4 on line G. ∴ P7 = P6 [s07 /s7 ]
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Via the latter set of statement replacements we can surely assert that the pair (P0 , P7 ) is contained in the transitive closure of ⇒ and thence P0 ⇒+ P7 . Furthermore, based on our first
example, in this instance, we will also provide the propositions which denote the structure of each
program version (i.e. P0 and P7 ). In the following set of statements each statement label denotes
a singleton statement set. The corresponding statement replacement will be given by the corresponding primed Greek variable as it is shown below.
α , f (2) = b := 9 − a/5 V α0 , f 0 (2) = b := 6
β , f (5) = c := b ∗ 4 V β 0 , f 0 (5) = c := 12
δ , f (6) = if c > 10 then V δ 0 , f 0 (6) = if T rue then
γ , f (7) = c := c − 10 V γ 0 , f 0 (7) = c := 2
 , f (8) = d := c ∗ (60/a) V 0 , f 0 (8) = d := 4
Furthermore, it follows that P0 , α ∧ β ∧ γ ∧ δ ∧  and similarly, P7 , α0 ∧ β 0 ∧ γ 0 ∧ δ 0 ∧ 0 .
Moreover, let us define the following predicate which will denote the transformation applied to P0
by cfold(P0 ) , (P0 ⇒+ P7 ) and therefore, cfold(P0 ) , α0 ∧ β 0 ∧ γ 0 ∧ δ 0 ∧ 0 . Thence, in this
example. we are required to prove that:

P0 ∧ cfold(P0 )  (d = 4) .
4.6.1

(4.8)

Proof

Since the transformations were done via our already defined versioning model, then we can assert
that

R |= (α ∧ . . . ∧  ∧ cfold(P0 ))  (α0 ∧ . . . ∧ 0 ) .
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(4.9)

var :
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12

x : Integer := 1;
y : Integer := 2;
z : Integer := 3;
i : Integer := 0;
w : Integer := 0;
skip ;
begin
f o r i : = 1 t o 100 do b e g i n
w := i ;
z := x + y
end
end

Figure 4.4: Source code for the loop hoisting example
By a simple post-condition analysis (which we will not include here given its trivial nature) we
can also assert that (α0 ∧ β 0 ∧ γ 0 ∧ δ 0 ∧ 0 ) → (d = 4) and thence, by the conditional deduction
axiom we can assert that:

[α ∧ . . . ∧  ∧ cfold(P0 )]  (d = 4) .

(4.10)

Since P0 , α ∧ β ∧ γ ∧ δ ∧ , we can directly conclude that [P0 ∧ cfold(()P0 )]  (d = 4)
which is exactly what we had claimed. 

4.7

Third Example

In this example we will show that after a code hoisting modification on the provided source code
still behaves the same. Below we provide the example source code which consists of a simple loop
whose original loop body consists of two assignments. The first statement is surely dependent on
the loop variable (i.e. i) and thus it will not be affected by code hoisting. The second statement is
composed of a LHS and a RHS which does not depend on the loop variable and hence, the whole
statement may be extracted from the loop body.
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Let us denote the code in Figure 4.4 as P0 . Notice that, in Figure 4.4 we have only labeled
two lines given that the loop hoisting program transformation will consist of a swap of these two
lines. Furthermore let us declare the following predicates which will let us integrate the programs’
structure into our proof:
• α , f (6) = skip
• β , f (10) = z := x + y
• δ , f 0 (10) = skip
• γ , f 0 (6) = z := x + y
Thus we can declare an alternative version in which statements sA and sB will be swapped.
Thence, P1 , P0 [s6 /s10 ][s10 /s6 ]. The latter implies that in P1 the statement z := x + y is removed
from the loop body. Moreover, in the same manner as we did in section 4.6, we claim that a simple
static analysis similar to the one done in section 4.5 will let us assert that:

P0 → (w = 5050) .

(4.11)

At this point we can use the proof theoretical fragment that pertains to our approach. More
specifically, we can invoke the conditional deduction rule which will assert below for reference
purposes,
`λ→ψ
` (φ  λ) → (φ  ψ)
For this purpose we will use the following instantiation:
λ , P0
0
φ , P0 ∧ swapP6,10

ψ , w = 5050
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We can see that by 4.11 the needed hypothesis regarding the conditional deduction rule already
holds. Hence, by Modus Ponens we can assert that:

0
0
)  (w = 5050)] .
)  P0 ] → [(P0 ∧ swapP6,10
[(P0 ∧ swapP6,10

(4.12)

If we look at the antecedent for the implication in 4.12, we can readily verify that according to
the model theory (semantics) exposed in [29] we have that for any well-formed expressions σ, τ ,
(σ ∧τ )  τ and (σ ∧τ )  σ are valid assertions. Thence, by the completeness of counterfactual
logic, it follows that these are axioms in the proof-theoretical sense. Thus, by Modus Ponens, in
0
)  (w = 5050) which is want we wanted to prove.
our case it readily follows that (P0 ∧ swapP6,10



4.8

Conclusion

We have introduced a logical calculus based on Lewis’ theory of counterfactuals. Additionally
we have shown that if we know how to unambiguously characterize the transformation from the
initial version to the future desired version then, the conjunction between the structural properties
of the initial version and the predicates that characterize the transformation, imply the desired
future version’s properties. The proof we presented could be easily expressed in terms of a natural
deduction system and be automated.
If we think about the implications regarding the capabilities of our counterfactual calculus, it
would not be hard task to extend it up to the point where we can also verify refactoring-based
development without actually having to produce the new versions and subjecting them to the usual
regression test-based debugging process.

34

Chapter 5
Counterfactually Reasoning About Security

5.1

Introduction

In this chapter, we provide the background to counterfactual logic and give very general suggestions on how we could employ this logic to help us reason about security policies. It seems very
appropriate to use this kind of logic to anticipate a change that will compromise the security concerns of a given system before actually applying the changes1
.
In the realm of software security, changes regarding security policies are pervasive. It is in
this constant changing environment where a system’s security becomes compromised. In practice,
security policies are changed and, in the worst case, any defect or undesired effect is usually found
after the fact and often too late. Requiring that the security policies remain unchanged is out of
the question and blatantly unrealistic. Therefore, we are in need of mechanisms that enable us to
formalize the security policies, the changes regarding security policies and the future effect of said
changes.
In this chapter we present a framework for what-if analysis of security policies based on Lewis’
theory of counterfactuals [29]. The framework can be used to statically perform change-impact
analysis for access control matrices. It enables us to verify assertions about a changed version of
an access control matrix without actually incorporating the changes. We present a logical calculus
that precisely characterizes potential structural modifications to source code and their impact on
the program’s behavior.
1

Portions of this chapter were published in:

Manuel Peralta, Supratik Mukhopadhyay, and Ramesh Bharadwaj. Counterfactually reasoning about security. In
Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Security of information and networks, SIN ’11, pages 223–226,
New York, NY, USA, 2011. ACM.
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5.2

Counterfactual Theory

The logic of counterfactuals helps us reason about assertions that are not a matter of fact. In [29]
Lewis provided a sound and complete proof system and proved its decidability. Based on the logic
of counterfactuals we derive a logical calculus that allows us to assert properties that would hold
for a future version of a given program and verify that these would indeed hold if the changes
needed to obtain that version were actually implemented.

5.2.1

The Language of Counterfactual Theory

In coherence with [29] we will briefly introduce the language regarding the logic of counterfactuals
below (pi denotes a propositional variable):

φ ::= pi |¬φ|φ ∧ φ|φ ∨ φ|φ → φ|φ  φ
The counterfactual sentence φ  ψ should be read as: if it had been the case that φ, it
would have been the case that ψ. Thus, if we had an assertion whose antecedent ranged over
the properties of some given access control matrix and also the changes needed to produce a new
version and whose consequent ranged over the properties that a new version would have, then we
could use counterfactual logic to code such an assertion.

5.2.2

Formal Representation of A Security Model

In this section we will define a simple variation of the Access Control Matrix (ACM) model. This
model was first introduced in [28] and [16]. We have chosen this model due to its simplicity and
readily intuitive nature and widespread use as it is stated in [28]. First of all, we will define three
sets: S, O and A which are respectively the set of : subjects, objects and actions. The set of
subjects contains the active entities on the system (i.e. users, computer systems, etc.); the set of
objects denotes the set of entities over which subject are allowed or denied a certain action. The
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set of actions denotes those tasks which a subject can perform on a given object. Hence:

S

= {si }i∈I

The set of subjects

O = {oj }j∈J

The set of objects

A = {Read, W rite}

The set of actions

Thus, we can now formally define an access control matrix as a function M : S × O → 2A
which takes an ordered pair composed of a subject and an object and assigns to them a subset of
the possible set of actions. Moreover, in this instance we will have to work with M ’s intentional
or set representation and thence:

M , {(si , oj , αk )} where αk ∈ 2A
Encoding Change in the ACM model
Let M = {(si , oj , αk )i,j,k∈N } be the current version of the access control matrix. We can encode
the state of any ACM by using the following formula:

ΨM ,

p
n ^
m ^
^

(si , oj , αk ) ∈ M

i=1 j=1 k=1

We will simplify the latter expression using the following notation:

ΨM ,

^

(si , oj , αk )

i,j,k

For the sake of simplicity we will define a change to the ACM as a change to the members of
the action-set of a given triple. Hence, a change may be represented as:

(si , oj , αk ) ⇒c (si , oj , αk0 )
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It can be readily inferred that ⇒c is a three-place-relation over S × O × A. Furthermore, let
M denote the class of all possible ACM versions. Therefore, ⇒c can be thought of as a binary
relation over M and

M ⇒c M 0 iff M 0 , M [αk /αk0 ]
Moreover we define ⇒c to be the smallest relation such that the following holds:

(si , oj , αk ) ⇒c (si , oj , αk0 ) iff:
1. αk0 6= ∅ when αk 6= ∅
2. αk0 6= A when αk = A
Undesirable Configurations
In any system, there is a set of undesirable states. These states may be very possibly members of
the entire set of possible states. One of the fundamental purposes of any security mechanisms is to
guarantee that for any possible transition (that originates in a safe/legal state) the target state will
not be an illegal/undesirable state. In this instance an undesired state will be denoted by a given
configuration/triple of subject, object and action. Therefore, let U ⊆ S ×O × A be the set of illegal
configurations and let τu range over this set.
We want to avoid allowing a configuration change in which we enable an undesirable triple be
part of the new version of the ACM. Hence, we want to avoid the following:

M ⇒c M 0 where τu ∈ M 0
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Secure Counterfactual Change
Our objective is to enable counterfactual logic to let us decide whether or not a change to the
current version of the ACM implies that at least one illegal triple is part of the future resulting
version. Thence our secure counterfactual implication can be expressed as:

[

^

(si , oj , αk )] ∧ (s0 , o0 , α0 )[α0 /α00 ]  (τu 6∈ M 0 )

i,j,k∈N

5.2.3

Kripke Versioning Model

In [29] the author provides the semantics of his counterfactual propositional logic using a multipleworld interpretation. In that same manner we have chosen to interpret our access control matrix
transformation. In our case, each ACM version will represent a world. In the following definition,
we take the liberty of writing ti ← tj to denote that the tuple ti was swapped by tuple tj . Below,
we provide a formal interpretation based on a Kripke model.
Definition 5.2.1 (Kripke Version Model) A Kripke Version Model R is a triple hM, ⇒, M0 i where:
1. M = {Mk }k∈N is the set of all access control matrix versions (ACM states).
2. M0 is the initial access control matrix.
3. ⇒⊆ M × M is a binary relation defined the set of all possible ACM versions. Where ⇒ is
the smallest relation such that the following properties hold:
(a) ti ← ti : tuple si is left unchanged. This stands for the do nothing transformation.
(b) ti ← tj : tuple tj replaces statement ti , where tj ∈ Mk . We usually call this primitive
transformation, a swap.
(c) ti ← tj : statement tj replaces statement ti , where tj 6∈ Mk . Thus, sk is a new
statement.
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(d) (∀i)ti ∈ Mk can be changed only once.
Furthermore, we assume that the relation ⇒ complies with the properties of reflexivity, symmetry, and transitivity. Below, we justify each property based on the latter definition of ⇒:
1. Reflexivity: For any ACM Mi ∈ M, it is obvious that the do-nothing transformation will
yield that any ACM can be transformed into itself. Therefore, Mi ⇒ Mi given that for all
sj ∈ Mi , Mi = Mi [sj /sj ]
2. Symmetry: For any ACMs Mi , Mj ∈ M any of the above transformations can be reversed
and therefore, Mi ⇒ Mj implies Mj ⇒ Mi .
3. Transitivity: For any ACMs Mi , Mj , Mk ∈ M, applying two or more transformations
to a program will yield intermediate versions; this is equivalent to transforming the initial
version by composing the transformations into one. Thus, Mi ⇒ Mj and Mj ⇒ Mk imply
that Mi ⇒+ Mk . Where ⇒+ denotes ⇒ ◦ ⇒n−1 and n > 1.
5.2.4

Interpreting the Counterfactual Implication

As it was stated earlier, the purpose of our model is to help interpret assertions in the language of
counterfactual logic. Let M0 denote our given initial ACM version. Also, let us assume we had a
counterfactual assertion, namely φ  ψ in which:
• φ stands for assertions regarding M0 and some transformation ti ← tj that implies that
M1 = M0 [ti /tj ]
• ψ stands for assertions regarding M1
Thus, following the model-theoretic interpretation proposed by Lewis in [29], our version of
the counterfactual implication is interpreted as:
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R |= φ  ψ .

(5.1)

Where R denotes our previously defined Kripke Versioning Model. Moreover, letting αi , βi
denote propositional statements about the structure of Mi and Mj respectively, then, we can state
that:
φ , (

n
^

αi ) ∧ (Mi ⇒+ Mj )

i=1

ψ ,

m
^

βj

j=1
+

Where ⇒ denotes the positive/transtive closure for the relation ⇒. Furthermore, given an
initial ACM version, namely M0 , we produce several versions by applying one or more transformations to it. In the context of a counterfactual assertion, the current version’s structure and the
changes applied to it (in order to produce a new version) imply properties possessed the new version and hence:
V
R |= φ  ψ , (∃min k ∈ N)( ni=1 αi )
V
∧(M0 ⇒k M 0 ) → ( m
j=1 βj ) .
The latter should be interpreted as there exists a minimal number of transformation steps such
V
that given the properties of our initial ACM M0 (namely, ni=1 αi ) and the transformation between the two program versions implies the desired properties of the future ACM version (namely,
Vm
j=1 βj ).
5.3

Applications of Counterfactual Theory to Security

Each change to the access control matrix modifies the state of the security system. Hence, each
change reflects a change in the set of valid policies. It seems very promising to use counterfactual
logic to 1) encode the changes to the ACM, 2) express the undesirable state-tuples, and 3) assert
whether or not the changes counterfactually imply the undesirable tuples are part of the future state
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of the ACM. Given all the risks involved in changing security policies, it would be nice to foresee
their effect before incorporating them into production systems.

5.4

Conclusion

We have introduced a logical calculus based on Lewis’ theory of counterfactuals. Additionally we
have shown that if we know how to unambiguously characterize the transformation from the initial
ACM state to the future desired ACM state, the conjunction between the structural properties of
the initial ACM version and the predicates that characterize the transformation, imply the desired
future ACM state’s properties.
This chapter has presented a powerful and promising suggestion which consists of jointly using
a perhaps modified version of the ACM model and our counterfactual logical calculus. The latter
mix would enable practitioners verify a-priory the effects of a change to the ACM without actually
applying the change to production systems. Although it is widely known that the question of
whether or not a given security model enforces a given policy is a non-decidable problem, we are
confident that our simplified ACM model and our counterfactual logic will be helpful to enough
non-trivial applications.
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Chapter 6
Reasoning About Sensor Networks

6.1

Introduction

In this chapter, we study an approach for dynamically reconfiguring sensor networks that operate under dynamically changing environments. We show how dynamic reconfiguration can be
achieved using our Secure Operations Language for JAVA - based approach. We show how to
specify a reconfiguration using a counterfactual logic and provide techniques that enable us to
understand the impacts of change1 .
Sensor networks are embedded networked systems that receive percept streams from the environment and constantly react to them. From a software-based point of view, modifications done
to any system (SNS) should be performed under utmost caution as SNSs are often deployed in
mission-critical applications. The latter means that any disruption that inhibits the system in satisfying its operational semantics will definitively yield catastrophic results. Also, sensor networks
are required to react dynamically to ever-changing environmental conditions without human intervention. Therefore, one should strive to provide methods that ensure the correctness of SNSs
under reconfiguration is preserved i.e. the SNS respects it operational requirements while the system structure changes in response to an evolving environment.
For SNS applications, requirements dynamically change in a rapid, unpredictable, and continuous fashion. In applications such as those driving search and rescue missions, any operational
expansion/contraction requires dynamic reorganization of the system. For these application scenarios, any downtime resulting from upgrade of the control system leads to unacceptable disruption
1

Portions of this chapter were published in:

Sitharama Iyengar and Richard Brooks, editors. Distributed Sensor Networks, Second Edition: Image and Sensor
Signal Processing, volume 2 of Computer & Information Science Series, chapter 31, pages 693–710. Chapman and
Hall/CRC, 2 edition, September 2012.
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of service. As a result, continued availability of such systems in a mission-critical setting, even
under dynamically changing requirements, is of utmost importance. We need to develop techniques, tools, and methods that can build, manage, and maintain SNS systems whose requirements
keep changing perpetually during their lifecycle. Such systems should be able to autonomously
re-engineer themselves rapidly online under changing requirements, with minimal or no disruption
in service, and yet meeting all constraints of timeliness, cost, and performance in a reasonable way.
Traditional software development methodologies assume that requirements are well understood
and available, in the form of a formal or rigorous specification, of the required system behavior.
However, this assumption fails to hold for software that is meant to control SNS applications deployed in rapidly evolving scenarios. While it is possible to develop logically precise requirements
for software computing mathematical functions, the behavior of a software system depends on extraneous factors that are not usually foreseen during its development. These include factors such
as platform of deployment (e.g., the word length of the machine on which the software is run),
the communication protocols used, the amount of memory available, etc. In software solving real
world problems, such extraneous factors are compounded by those from the system’s physical environment that expect the software to cope with dynamically changing business constraints. In
some cases, given time and money, it is possible to get the original developers to update the software to meet the changed business requirements. However, in certain cases, such an update may
not be possible even with adequate time and money (e.g., the original developers may have moved
away from the technology and it may not be possible to acquire a suitable team to build on their
work). In these situations, the system must be phased out with millions of dollars in software
development cost wasted.
Conventional approaches used in industry are inadequate in rapidly evolving mission-critical
scenarios, due to (1) the unpredictable nature of the evolution of the system requirements, (2)
dynamically changing situational environments driven by the dynamics of the market/missionpartners, including rapid mergers, disinvestment, formation of coalitions, noisy and unpredictable
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communication channels, and cyber-attacks aimed at disruption of the network. We use the phrase
”Perpetual Requirements Engineering” to denote an approach where we address dynamically changing requirements throughout the software lifecycle, including autonomous rapid reconfiguration
and persistent redeployment of distributed software systems without disruption to service commitments, in an expeditious manner. Our approach improves on the agile development paradigm.
Traditionally, agile development has been used successfully for software projects with rapidly
changing requirements. One example of the agile development approach is extreme programming.
In agile development, activities generally alternate between modeling and coding, with major portions of the design being generated as implementation proceeds. Traditional agile development
approaches, however, suffer from a lack of automated support. Manual effort is needed to incorporate any changes in the requirements into a software artifact. Extensive manual refactoring of
code is often needed to ameliorate the effects of dynamically changing code requirements. System updates are developed manually, at a huge cost and in an untimely and unpredictable manner.
This is one inhibiting factor on the scalability of agile development methods, thereby making them
suitable only for development projects of a small or moderate size. This is also the reason why
traditional agile development methods tend to succeed only when an experienced development
team is available. Lack of dynamic adaptation means frequent shipping of new code in response
to ever-changing requirements. This not only adds to the cost but also results in increased downtime of deployed software due to frequent updates to the running code. While the involvement of
the customer is an essential component of the agile development method, in many situations, it
becomes difficult for the development team to stay in touch with the customer, especially in the
post-deployment stage (e.g., consider projects whose development is outsourced).
In large software projects with dynamically changing requirements as usually encountered in
the development of SNS applications, instead of manually performing development iterations every
time a requirement changes, we need to implement techniques and strategies for automatic incremental update of system or subsystem components comprising the deployed software, in response
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to changing requirements. We need a requirements engineering paradigm that can automatically
reflect incremental changes in the requirements by a dynamic reconfiguration and persistent update
of the running software.

6.2

Perpetual Requirements Engineering for Sensor Networks

In the context of perpetual requirements in SNSs we have developed an approach that relies on
two technological elements. The first is Secure Operations Language for Java (SOLj) [6] which
is an event-based domain-oriented synchronous programming extension of Java used to write the
specification for agents which, in this context, are the software counterparts of one or more sensors. The second element is the Secure Infrastructure for Networked Systems (SINS). SINS a is a
distributed run-time system in which the SOLj agents are deployed. The SINS run-time and framework provide a set of security policies which help avoid compromising the SOLj agents behavior
and interactions.

6.2.1

SOLj - Secure Operations Language-JAVA

SOLj: Secure Operations Language-Java. Given that SOLj is an extension of Java, it is presented
as modular extensions to its core language, i.e., Java. A module comprises the specification unit in
SOLj; it is composed of type definitions, variable declarations, service declarations, assumptions
and guarantees and definitions. In the future we will use the word agent to denote a module
instance. A SOLj module may include attributes as they are described below:
deterministic Declares a module that does not exhibit nondeterministic behavior. The compliance
with this attribute is checked by the SOLj compiler.
reactive Declares a module that will cause a state change only when its (visible) environment
fires an event via a state change or by invoking a method. Also, this attribute denotes that
the module’s response to an event will happen in the next immediate step.
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The type definition section contains user-defined types as well as enumerated types. The Java
comment //@type definitions precedes the “type definitions” section. It provides SOLj
directive to the compiler indicating the start of the type definition section. The variable declaration
section defines three types of variable which are explained below:
monitored variables variables in the environment that influence the agent’s behavior.
controlled variables variables in the environment that are changed by the agent’s behavior.
internal variables this variables reflect the agent’s internal state.
The Java comment //@Services precedes the “service declarations” section which declares
the agent’s external interface. It contains the methods that realize the services the module provides. For each method declaration within a service, the SOLj language provides the capability of
declaring the corresponding preconditions and postconditions which denote the conditions under
which each service should start and terminate. The preconditions and postconditions are encoded
as arithmetic expressions and type declarations. A type declaration is denoted by a type judgement
expression T:x where x is a variable and T is a type. These constraints are enforced at runtime
in a dynamic manner. Also, each service invocation must use a “continuation variable”. This variable includes a boolean field called “done” which is assigned a value of true once the service
invocation is ready to provide a return value.
The //@Assumptions comment denotes the start of the assumptions section which includes
assumptions that determine the agent’s correct way to operate. If any of these assumptions is violated by the environment, the agent’s execution is aborted. The guarantees section contains the
agent’s required safety properties. The definitions section provides update functions which
denote variable definitions. These specify the corresponding values for internal and controlled variables. For the sake of future references, we will distinguish between monitored variables whose
values are given by the environment, and dependent variables which are those whose values that
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are the result of SOLj agents computations. These values are obtained using the values of monitored variables and (possibly) past dependent variable’s values.

6.2.2

SOLj Events

Based on the Software Cost Reduction (SCR) method’s SCR Abstract Language (SAL), SOLj has
been provided with the capability of defining events [23]. Intuitively, SCR events can be interpreted as state changes. Moreover, the occurrence of an event is triggered when a variable has its
value changed. This is done by update functions which change the dependent variable’s value.
@T(c) =def ¬@PREV(c) ∧ c
@F(c) =def @PREV(c) ∧ ¬c
@C(c) =def @PREV(c) 6= c
An initialization method (init) assigns starting values to all dependent variables (controlled
or internal). Each module contains an init method. Each dependent variable is updated by just
one of the update functions. Moreover, a dependency relation is induced by the interplay between
update functions and dependent variables. We denote this relation with Dm . Let a and b be two
dependent variables, then we say that (a, b) ∈ Dm if and only if a is updated by the function
corresponding to b. The fact that a may depend on the previous values of other variables and itself
does not influence the dependency relation. Also, a dependency graph may be derived from Dm
by interpreting the set of dependent variables as the nodes and each (a, b) ∈ Dm as the edges 2 .
For each module, we need to consider its corresponding dependency graph as acyclic.
From a simplified point of view, a SOLJ program executes in a sequence of steps and each step
is preceded by the triggering of an event. The module’s dependency relation induces the order in
which the variable updates and service invocations are carried out. Each computation step may be
decomposed as follows:
2

The notion of a dependency relation is easily extended to the entire system.
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1. The environment or the agent itself triggers an event in a nondeterministic manner
2. Each agent responds to this event by modifying the values of its dependent variables
From an external point of view, the updates and service invocations can be thought of happening in a synchronous manner (as it is dictated by the Synchrony Hypothesis and exemplified
by languages such as Esterel and LUSTRE [21]. The latter implies that all dependent variable
updates and service invocations that occur as a response to an event triggering, happen before the
next event is triggered.

6.2.3

SOLj Definitions

The main part of a SOLj module is the definitions section. This section declares and defines the update function that corresponds to each dependent variable. Update functions provide
the value of the updated dependent variable. An update function’s body is comprised of return
statements which are constrained by conditional expressions. These are activated by events triggers initiated by the environment and/or the agent. Syntactically, these conditional expressions are
denoted by Java conditional expressions with the difference that the guards are SOLj events.
SOLj expressions can be service invocations such as A:B(varList)ˆcont. The identifier
A denotes the name/URL of the service; B denotes the name of the invoked method; varList
denotes the set of formal parameters that are provided to the invoked method and cont denotes
the unique continuation variable associated with the invocation. When the “done” field in the
continuation is assigned “true” the service invocation has terminated. Finally, a compiler derives
Java code from the SOLj definitions. This derived code executes on the Secure Infrastructure for
Networked Systems (SINS).
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6.2.4

SINS

SOLj module instances interact in a runtime environment called Secure Infrastructure for Networked Systems (SINS). Generally, a SINS implementation consists of a set (one or more) SINS
Virtual Machines (SVM). Each of these virtual machines acts as a container for one or more agents
in a given host node. Distributed SVMs communicate amongst themselves using the Agent Control
Protocol (ACP) [52] with the purpose of exchanging agent and control information. A supplementary protocol, known as the Module Transfer Protocol (MTP) takes care of the code distribution,
digital signatures, authentication, and code integrity. Complying with locally enforced security
policies, SOLj agents are allowed to access local resources in a host. Compliance with these security policies is verified using an inductive theorem prover. Observer agents (termed “security
agents”) are in charge of enforcing other safety property and security requirements. These agents
monitor the execution of application-specific agents and also engage in corrective actions once a
violation is detected.

6.3

A SOLJ Example - Auto-regulated Power Generation Network

The following example will be employed as a didactic tool in order to illustrate how our SOLjSINS-based approach looks like in a practical setting.

6.3.1

General Aspects

In the realm of power generation and considering a very simple perspective, we have the interplay
of three interrelated variables: voltage, current and resistance. In large scale power distribution
networks such interplay of these variables can mean the difference between efficient or wasteful
power distribution. It would be desirable, thus, to have a sensor-network-based system, which
would adequately react to changes in this quantities in a dynamic manner.
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6.3.2

System Description

Our simplified sensor network for power generation system is comprised mainly by two types of
agents:
Distribution Line Agent (DistLineAgent) This agent type is in charge of communicating the
state of the distribution lines to the GenAgents i.e. it reports the conditions regarding
voltage and resistance. Figure 7.2 shows the SOLj source code for this type of agent.
Generation-Engine Agent (GenAgent) This agent type is responsible of regulating the electrical
current that is input into the electrical distribution system based on the voltage and resistance
on distribution lines. Figure 7.3 shows the SOLj source code for this type of agent.

6.3.3

System Operation

Let us assume that we are dealing with an electrical distribution network comprised of several
GenAgents and multiple DistLineAgents. Furthermore, let us assume that the environment
temperature variations (the material’s own reaction to conducting current and environmental heat)
dilate and contract the inner core of the conducting cables. Therefore, the conducting cables’ resistance is also variable. From general Physics we know that these three quantities are interrelated
by the following formula:

I=

V
R

Where I stands for the electrical current in the system (measured in Amperes), V stands for the
system’s voltage (measured in Volts) and R stands for the conducting cables’ resistance (measured
in Ohms).
The DistLineAgents via sensors placed along the distribution lines, have the knowledge
of the actual current and resistance along the distribution line system and they communicate this
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information back to the set of GenAgents which in turn regulate the electrical generators that
provide the input electrical current to the distribution network. When, for instance, the environment
exhibits a high temperature (due to heat wave perhaps), the resistance in the distribution lines will
increase. Provided that the voltage remains the same, the correct reaction of the system would be
to increase power production. The GenAgents monitor the resistance and can thus react to this
change in the distribution system by actuating the generation engines to produce more power.

6.4

Counterfactuals in Sensor Networks

Counterfactual logic aids us in reasoning about statements that are not matter of fact. Lewis [29]
provided a sound and complete inference system and also stated that this logic was a decidable
one. We have created a logical calculus based on counterfactual logic. This calculus allows us
to express properties that would take place in a future version of a given program and verify that
indeed these properties would hold if the changes between the new and old version were applied.

6.4.1

The Language of Counterfactual Theory

As it is shown in [29] we will shortly define the language that comprises the logic of counterfactuals
(pi denotes a propositional variable)

φ ::= pi |¬φ|φ ∧ φ|φ ∨ φ|φ → φ|φ  φ
The counterfactual expression φ  ψ should be read as: if it had been the case that φ, it
would have been the case that ψ. Therefore, if we had a statement that contained an anteceded
that expressed the properties of a given program and the required changes to create the new version
and the consequent expressed the properties that the new version would exhibit, then it seems
plausible that we can encode such a statement using counterfactual logic.
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//@Module Declaration
deterministic reactive module DistLineAgent
//@Type definitions
Voltage = floatStream;
Current = floatStream;
Resistance = floatStream;
//@Controlled variables
Voltage currVoltage;
Current currCurrent;
Resistance currRes;
//@Monitored variables
Voltage observedVoltage;
Current observedCurrent;
Resistance observedRes;
//@definitions
//@initialization
void init(){
currVoltage = null;
currCurrent = null;
currRes
= null;
}
//@update functions
Resistance outputResistance(){
if(@C(observedRes) && @T(observedRes >= thresholdRes))
return currRes;
}
Voltage outputVolatge(){
if(@C(observedVoltage) &&
@T(observedVoltage >= thresholdVoltage))
return currVoltage;
}
Current outputCurrent(){
if(@C(observedCurrent) &&
@T(observedCurrent >= thresholdCurrent))
return currCurrent;
}

Figure 6.1: SOLJ code for the DistLineAgent module
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//@Module Declaration
deterministic reactive module DistLineAgent
//@Type definitions
Voltage = floatStream;
Current = floatStream;
Resistance = floatStream;
Revolutions = floatStream;
//@Controlled variables
Revolutions rpm;
//@Monitored variables
Voltage currVoltage;
Current currCurrent;
Resistance currRes;
Revolutions currRevs;
//@Services
//@ Revolutions EGenerator:RevUpEngine(revDelta)
//@ pre = (currCurrent >= thresholdCurrent) &&
//@
(currVolate <= thresholdVoltage)
//@
//@ post = currRevs > rpm
//@ Revolutions EGenerator:RevDownEngine(revDelta)
//@ pre = (currCurrent < thresholdCurrent) ||
//@
(currVoltage > thresholdVoltage)
//@
//@ post = currRevs < rpm

//@Update Functions
Revolutions UpdateRPMs(){
if(@C(currVoltage) && @C(currCurrent))
return EGenerator:RevUpEngine(revDelta)ˆrevUpCont;
else
return EGenerator:RevDownEngine(revDelta)ˆrevDownCont;

Figure 6.2: SOLj source code for GenAgent
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6.4.2

Formal Description of SOLj Agent Network

Given what was presented in earlier sections, we can abstract a sensor network, by considering
the set of SOLj agents that realize its behavior. Let Mi denote the syntactically correct code for a
given agent, then, we can denote a SOLj agent network by the following parallel composition:

SN0 , M1 ||M2 || . . . ||Mn
A new version of a given sensor network will be created when at least the code of one agent is
changed (as indicated by our Program Transformer Approach). Hence, a new version of a given
by the following expression:

SN1 , M1 ||M2 || . . . ||Mi [sj /s0j ] . . . ||Mn
Where Mi is the changed SOLj agent module and sj and s0j are the changed (swapped) statements within Mi ’s specification code. In general, any number of modules within the parallel composition may be changed by an arbitrary number of statement swaps. In terms of logical descriptions we can also denote the SOLj agent network by the following extended conjunction:

ΨSN ,

n
^

Mi

i=1

Where each Mi is denoted by:

ΨMi ,

m
^

f (j) = Statj

j=1

Where f (j) is the (uninterpreted) function symbol that denotes line in the SOLj agent’s code
and Statj is a well- formed statement in the SOLj specification language. The two latter expressions yield that the logical expression corresponding to a SOLJ network will be:
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ΨSN ,

n ^
m
^

fi (j) = Statj

i=1 j=1

The latter expression does not imply that all SOLJ agents have the same number(i.e. m) of
statements. We can freely assume that m is just the number that denotes the longest SOLj module
in the system.

6.4.3

Program Transformers

In [17] the authors define the notion of predicate transformer; it can be defined as a first order logic
formula which yields (via existential quantifier elimination) the weakest precondition for a given
command (a statement in a imperative language) and its corresponding post-condition. Inspired by
the latter notion we have found a way to logically express program transformation using what we
call Program Transformers.
Let ΨSN denote the conjunction of formulas shown in section 6.4.2. Furthermore, we choose
to model possible program transformations using the following formula:
(∀u ∈ U )(u 6= ui ) ∧ (u 6= uj ) → (f (u) = f 0 (u))
∧

(f (ui ) = f 0 (uj ))

∧

(f (uj ) = f 0 (ui ))

The latter expression denotes the existence of a new SOLj module f 0 that happens to differ
from our original SOLj module f only by swapping two statements (i.e. ui and uj ). In the rest of
the section we shall use ΨS to refer to the implication above. With ΨSN defined as above, we can
formally express our program transformer expression as:

ΨT , (∃f )(∃R)ΨSN ∧ ΨS
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Notice that ΨT is a second order logic formula since we are quantifying over one function
symbol and one relation symbol. Also, let us assume that we have a fixed SOLj module f0 . By
definition, f0 is a finite list of statements in Stat. Thence, we can logically express f0 : U → Stat
by a finite conjunction of equalities as it is expressed below:

Φf ,

^

f0 (i) = Stati

i∈U

Where Φf is the logical formula that represents f0 and Stati is a well-formed statement in
SOLj. Therefore, we can ”apply” ΨT to Φf by joining them by conjunction which produces the
following formula:

ΨT ∧ Φf , (∃f )(∃R)ΨP ∧ ΨS ∧ Φf
Notice that we can only eliminate the quantifier f in the formula above. As a result we obtain a
logical expression that denotes f0 ’s new version (f 0 ). Also, since we cannot eliminate the quantified
variable R (an n-ary relational symbol) given that elimination of relation symbols is still an open
problem in second order logic. Therefore, the resulting formula for f 0 is relatively more complex
compared to the one for f0 .
Also, do notice that, we may only eliminate the quantified f in the latter formula. The resulting
formula will be the logical expression that denotes our new version of f0 , namely, f 0 , however,
notice that, since we cannot eliminate the quantified variable R (as elimination of n-ary quantified
relation symbols is an open problem), the resulting expression is not quite the corresponding formula for f 0 in the same manner Φf denoted f0 .
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6.4.4

Kripke Versioning Model

The author of [29] defines the semantics of propositional counterfactual logic using a multipleworld-based model. Therefore, we have opted to use a similar model to interpret our program
transformations. In this instance, each version of the program will represent a possible world. Once
we apply a program transformer (as it was defined in the last section) we produce the formula for
a new version i.e. the transformation establishes the relationship between two possible worlds in
our model (the two program versions). In what follows, we take the liberty of writing si ← sj
to represent the fact that the statement si was swapped by statement sj . The following definition
provide a formal interpretation of our counterfactual logic.
Definition 6.4.1 (Kripke Version Model) A Kripke Version Model R is a triple hP, ⇒, P0 i where:
1. P = {Pk }k∈N is the set of all n-line programs which are the different program versions.
2. P0 is the initial program.
3. ⇒⊆ P × P is a binary relation defined the set of all possible program versions. Where ⇒
is the smallest relation such that the following properties hold:
(a) si ← si , statement si is left unchanged. This stands for the do nothing transformation.
(b) si ← sj , statement sj replaces statement si , where sj ∈ Pk . We usually call this
primitive transformation, a swap.
(c) si ← sj , statement sj replaces statement si , where sj 6∈ Pk . Thence, sk is a new
statement.
(d) (∀i)si ∈ Pk can be changed only once.
Moreover, we have assumed that the relation ⇒ is reflexive, symmetric, and transitive. Below
we justify the latter statement.
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1. Reflexivity: For any program Pi ∈ P, it is obvious that the do-nothing transformation will
yield that any program can be transformed into itself. Therefore, Pi ⇒ Pi given that for all
sj ∈ Pi , Pi = Pi [sj /sj ]
2. Symmetry: For any programs Pi , Pj ∈ P any of the above transformations can be reversed
and thence, Pi ⇒ Pj implies Pj ⇒ Pi .
3. Transitivity: For any programs Pi , Pj , Pk ∈ P, applying two or more transformations to a
program will yield intermediate versions; this is equivalent to transforming the initial version
by composing the transformations into one. Thus, Pi ⇒ Pj and Pj ⇒ Pk imply that Pi ⇒+
Pk . Where ⇒+ , ⇒ ◦ ⇒n−1 and n > 1.
6.4.5

Interpreting the Counterfactual Implication

Based on what was stated earlier, the main purpose of the model we have defined is to provide the
interpretation for our counterfactual-based program transformers. To that end, we let P0 denote
the source code of a given program. Furthermore, we assume we have a counterfactual statement
that expressed a change being done to the program as φ  ψ, where
• φ stands for assertions regarding P0 and some transformation si ← sj that implies that
P1 = P0 [si /sj ]
• ψ stands for assertions regarding P1
Thus, following the model-theoretic interpretation proposed by Lewis in [29], our version of
the counterfactual implication is interpreted as:

R |= φ  ψ .
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(6.1)

Where R denotes our previously defined Kripke Versioning Model. Moreover, letting αi , βi
denote propositional statements about the structure of Pi and Pj respectively, then, we can state
that:
φ , (

n
^

αi ) ∧ (Pi ⇒+ Pj )

i=1

ψ ,

m
^

βj

j=1

The ⇒+ symbol denotes the positive/transitive closure regarding the relation ⇒. Moreover,
from an initial version source-code version P0 we generate future alternative versions via the application of one ore more transformations. The current version’s properties and the changes made
to this version imply the desired properties the new version would have. Therefore:
V
R |= φ  ψ , (∃min k ∈ N)( ni=1 αi )
V
∧(P0 ⇒k P 0 ) → ( m
j=1 βj ) .
The expression above means that there is a minimal number of transformation steps such that
V
provided that the properties of our initial program P0 ( ni=1 αi ) and the transformation that leads
from the initial version to the desired future version are true, then it follows that the desired properties (encoded in our logic) of the future version also hold.

6.4.6

Fragment of Counterfactual Logic

Given that we are striving to provide programmers with an mechanical procedure and a tool whose
purpose is to aid in reasoning about the properties that would hold for future versions of a given
program, we provide a logical calculus which will enable us to infer such properties in a algorithmic manner. Thus, we provide the set of inference rules taken from [29] and known as VC logic;
these rules will help us formalize realize our approach’s proof theoretical fragment.
1.

` φ → ψ, φ
Modus Ponens
`ψ
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2.
3.

` ¬ψ  ψ
Vacuity
`φψ
φφ

Reflexivity rule

φψ
Counterfactual-Elimination rule
φ→ψ
V
` ( ni=1 λi ) → ψ
V
5.
Conditional Deduction rule
` [ ni=1 (φ  λi )] → (φ  ψ)

4.

6.

` 2(φ → ψ)
Counterfactual Necessity Theorem
`φψ

The reader may wonder about the Counterfactual Necessity Theorem (CNT). First of all, a
simple intuitive argument can be made in order to show why this is a theorem of VC. If we recall
Lewis’s system of spheres [29] and taking into account that VC subsumes many of the standard
proof-theoretical system of modal logic, then it is easy to see that the strict implication 2(φ → ψ)
will hold for all worlds in the system of spheres. Hence, the counterfactual implication φ  ψ
follows immediately by definition.
If the reader is still unconvinced about the theorem-hood regarding the CNT we suggest she
skips to our appendix and/or review [22] in which the authors give sufficient arguments about why
CNT is a theorem of VC.

6.4.7

Temporal Logic Fragment

Since a SOLj network exhibits a concurrent form of computation, we have to employ a more
expressive inference system than the one used for sequential computations (i.e. first order logic).
Thence, we need a fragment of temporal logic in order to encode properties of a SOLj network.
Such fragment is given below 3 .
1.
3

`φ
` 2φ

φ ranges over all the well-formed first-order logic expressions
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2. 2φ ↔ φ ∧

2φ

3. 2(φ → ψ) → (2φ → 2ψ)
4.
5.

6.5

(φ1 ∨ φ2 ) ↔

φ1 ∨

φ2

` φ1 → (φ1 ∨ φ2 )
` φ1 → φ1 U φ2
A Counterfactual Example - Auto-Regulated Power Generation Network

Using the agent types defined in section 6.2, we will briefly show how to apply our counterfactualbased approach to a practical situation.

6.5.1

Formal Characterization of a SOLJ Network’s Behavior

As it has been stated before, a SOLJ network is a reactive system and thus it continually responds to
different stimuli. In [35], we used counterfactual logic to assert properties of sequential programs.
However, in this instance, we are dealing with a perpetually functioning reactive system and thus
we need to integrate temporal logic constructs into our logic.
In the most simple case, a run in our system is just an infinite sequence of the basic actions
(function/service calls) performed by the network agents. Therefore, the following expression
denotes a run of the system we specified in 6.2

ρ1 , [(oC ∧ oR ∧ oV ) ∧ (rD ∧ ¬rU ∨ rU ∧ ¬rD)]
Where oC, oR, and oV denote the calls to the outputCurrent, outputResistance,
and outputVoltage update functions respectively. While ru and rD denote calls to the revUpEngine
and revDownEngine services. Thus, in terms of temporal logic, the runtime behavior exhibited
by the agents defined in Figures 7.2 and 7.3 is:
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2ρ1
Which is interpreted as an infinite sequence of calls to the services shown in ρ1 .
6.5.2

Source Code Change

Let us assume that there has been a change in the requirements of the system which imply that the
genAgent modules need only to augment the generators revolution when the current voltage exceeds certain threshold and decrease the revolutions when the current goes below certain threshold.
In terms of our logic, the actual state of the genAgent module is given by the following list:
• f (1) = “if (@C(currVoltage) && @C(currCurrent))”
• f (2) = “return EGenerator:RevUpEngine(revDelta)ˆrevUpCont”
• f (3) = “else”
• f (4) = “return EGenerator:RevDownEngine(revDelta)ˆrevDownCont”
Our intended change would alter the latter formulas into the ones shown in the following list:
• f 0 (1) = “if (@C(currVoltage))”
• f 0 (2) = “return EGenerator:RevUpEngine(revDelta)ˆrevUpCont”
• f 0 (3) = “if (@C(currCurrent))”
• f 0 (4) = “return EGenerator:RevDownEngine(revDelta)ˆrevDownCont”
The desired basic behavior for this new version of the SOLj agent network is given by the
following expression:
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ρ2 , [(oC ∧ oR ∧ oV ) ∧ (rD ∨ rU )]
Let ΨSN represent the current network structure in the same manner as the formulas defined in
6.4.2. Also, let swapSN
1,3 denote the following formula:
(u 6= 2) ∧ (u 6= 4) → (f (u) = f 0 (u))

6.5.3

∧

(f (1) = f 0 (3))

∧

(f (3) = f 0 (1))

Proof

In this section we will show the counterfactual implication statement that encodes the desired
program transformation and its effects. Let Ψ1SN and Ψ2SN respectively denote the logic expressions
for the current and desired configurations of the SOLj network. Furthermore, let ρ1 and ρ2 denote
the operation sequences that respectively correspond to Ψ1SN and Ψ2SN . Moreover, let swapSN
1,3 be
defined as before (i.e. the formula that encodes the change between Ψ1SN and Ψ2SN ). In an intuitive
way our claim may be formulated as:
SN
Given the initial structure of the system (ΨSN
1 ) and the desired change (swap1,3 ), then the

system would eventually transition from the initial behavior (denoted by 2ρ1 ) to the desired
behavior (denoted by 2ρ2 .)
Hence, using the already known fragments of counterfactual and temporal logics, we can symbolize the latter assertion as:

Ψ1SN ∧ swapSN
1,3  (2ρ1 U 2ρ2 )
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SOLj Network Axioms
We need to assume several facts in order to derive the desired counterfactual proof. First of all,
we readily assume that the formulas that denote each version configuration (i.e. Ψ1SN and Ψ2SN )
materially implies their respective behaviors. Thence:
1. Ψ1SN → 2ρ1
2. Ψ2SN → 2ρ2
Also, by definition of 2 in the fragment of temporal logic we are using, we can assert:
1. Ψ1SN → ρ1 ∧

2ρ1

2. Ψ2SN → ρ2 ∧

2ρ2

Using Propositional Logic we can weaken the consequent on both implications and hence we
have:
1. Ψ1SN →

2ρ1

2. Ψ2SN →

2ρ2

Temporal Logic Proof
The following step requires us to recall the definition of both ρ1 and ρ2 :

ρ1 , [(oC ∧ oR ∧ oV ) ∧ (rD ∧ ¬rU ∨ rU ∧ ¬rD)]

ρ2 , [(oC ∧ oR ∧ oV ) ∧ (rD ∨ rU )]
By simple propositional logic we can assert that ρ1 → ρ2 . Since temporal logic allows us to
use the Necessitation Rule then we know 2(ρ1 → ρ2 ) which in turn entails 2ρ1 → 2ρ2 . Since we
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already know that Ψ1SN → 2ρ1 therefore, by transitivity of material implication, we can state that
Ψ1SN → 2ρ2 . Again, taking into account the definition of 2 and by weakening the consequent we
can assert:
1. Ψ1SN →

2ρ1

2. Ψ1SN →

2ρ2

Notice that it is the case that ρ1 implies ρ2 , however, they are not equivalent. Hence, the system
could exhibit either of the two behaviors. Thence, given the latter implications and by weakening
and strengthening the consequent and antecedent respectively, we can assert the following:

Ψ1SN ∧ swapSN
1,3 →

2ρ1 ∨

2ρ2

Strengthening the antecedent in the latter step may seem arbitrary, but regarding our Program
Transformers, it means that we are applying the code transformation to the first version of the
SOLj Network. The temporal logic fragment we are employing allows us to assert Ψ1SN →
(2ρ1 ∨ 2ρ2 ). Based on the last step and using temporal logic again, we can assert what follows:

Ψ1SN ∧ swapSN
1,3 → 2ρ1 U 2ρ2
Counterfactual Proof
Temporal logic allows us to use the necessity rule and thus assert the following:

2[Ψ1SN ∧ swapSN
1,3 → (2ρ1 U 2ρ2 )]
Lastly, we employ the CNT from our counterfactual logic fragment and conclude that:
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Ψ1SN ∧ swapSN
1,3  (2ρ1 U 2ρ2 ) 
6.6

Theoremhood of The Counterfactual Necessity Theorem within The VC-Logic

Earlier in section 6.5.3 we established how our claim was a theorem of our proposed logic. In
this section we used the Counterfactual Necessity Theorem (CNT) whose proof was not given
immediately. The purpose of this section is to serve as a complement to the simple model-theoretic
justification we used. In what follows, we will provide a two fold argument of why CNT is a
theorem. The first subsection will re-define the notion of necessity (in our case, the global temporal
operator 2) in terms of the counterfactual conditional. The second subsection will establish the
formal proof of CNT’s theoremhood4 .

6.6.1

Necessity in Counterfactual Logic

In [22], the authors propose and prove a definition of necessity based on the counterfactual implication. We provide such definition below:

2α ↔ (¬α  ⊥)
Although the justification of such equivalence falls outside of the scope of this section, we can
intuitively and readily justify it based on Lewis’s model of spheres. A statement is necessary in this
model when it cannot counterfactually entail a contradiction. Moreover, if there are no α-worlds
in which contradiction holds then α must be a necessary statement. A more involved explanation
and a proof-theoretical justification of this can be found in [22].
In order to show the theoremhood of CNT we need to prove an additional auxiliary equivalence:
4
The proofs given in this section are adaptations of those shown in [22]. We saw the need of expanding the proofs
as we found that they were too succinct.
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(¬α  ⊥) ↔ (¬α  α)
By proving that the latter equivalence holds in VC we would be in position to assert 2α ↔
(¬α  α). Let α and β range over well-formed expressions in temporal logic. Let DWC be an
abbreviation of the Deduction Within Conditional rule of VC. Last but not least, we expand our
language’s vocabulary with ⊥ to denote proof-theoretical contradiction.The required proof is given
below:
1. (α ∧ ¬α) → ⊥ ⊥-Definition
2. [(¬α  α) ∧ (¬α  ¬α)] → (¬α  ⊥) DWC in 1
3. ¬α  ¬α Reflexivity
4. ¬α  α Assumption
5. (¬α  ¬α) ∧ (¬α  α) ∧-Intro in 3,4
6. ¬α  ⊥ Modus Ponens in 2 and 5
7. (¬α  α) → (¬α  ⊥) →-Intro in 4-6
8. ⊥ → α ⊥-Triviality
9. (¬α  ⊥) → (¬α  α) DWC in 8
10. [(¬α  ⊥) → (¬α  α)] ∧ [(¬α  α) → (¬α  ⊥)] ∧-Intro 7 and 9
11. (¬α  ⊥) ↔ (¬α  α) ↔-Intro in 10 
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6.6.2

Proof of CNT

Using the latter subsection’s results we will give the derivation which shows that CNT is a theorem
of VC.
1. 2(α → β) → [¬(α → β)  (α → β)] 2-def, ∧-elim
2. ⊥ → (α → β) ⊥-Triviality
3. [¬(α → β)  ⊥] → [¬(α → β)  (α → β)] DWC in 2
4. [¬(α → β)  (α → β)] → [α  (α → β)] Vacuity
5. 2(α → β) → [α  (α → β)] Transitivity in 1 and 4
6. [α ∧ (α → β)] → β Instantiation of Modus Ponens
7. [(α  α) ∧ (α  (α → β))] → (α  β) DWC in 6
8. 2(α → β) Assumption
9. [α  (α → β)] Modus Ponens in 8 and 5
10. α  α Reflexivity
11. (α  α) ∧ [α  (α → β)] ∧-Intro in 9 and 10
12. (α  β) Modus Ponens in 7 and 11
13. 2(α → β) → (α  β) →-Intro in 8-12 
Since CNT is indeed a theorem in VC we can freely use it in our main proof. Additionally,
although the authors of [22] use 2 as metaphysical necessity or simply alethic necessity, they also
assert that any logic which complies with the axioms of system K will be able to incorporate this
definition of 2. Since both VC and temporal logic subsume K we can assert that the redefinition
of this operator based on the counterfactual implication is not conflictive.
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6.7

Conclusion

We have introduced a framework for guaranteing safe source-code changes regarding reactive systems (i.e. sensor networks). The principles exhibited by this framework are realized by two pieces
of technology. The first is SOLj which is a domain-centric language based in the Software Cost
Reduction project (SCR). This language lets us precisely specify the desired behavior the reactive agents will exhibit during execution. In a nutshell, the SOLj language allows us to provide
the functional specification regarding a given reactive system. Moreover, we are able to readily
compile the agents’ SOLj code into standard JAVA source code. The next piece of technology that
allows us to realize our approach is known as Secure Infrastructure for Networked Systems (SINS).
SINS provides a run-time environment that enables a set of SOLj agents to run in a manner which
does not compromise system’s integrity (i.e. SINS helps us realize non-functional requirements as
general security, access policies, etc.).
Also, we have shown that our counterfactual verification approach (defined for sequential cases
in [35]) can also be used in simple reactive systems. We defined the language for counterfactual
logic, its syntax and semantics via program transformers formulas and Kripke structures respectively. In this instance, we were required to augment our logical language with a fragment of
temporal logic (as shown in [43]). The reason for the latter is that reactive systems exhibit properties that are expressed in terms of safety and liveness which can be conveniently expressed using
temporal logic. We first conjectured and then showed that the desired change and the current structure of the SOLj code counterfactually implied the desired change by encoding it as a sentence in
our logical language and then proving it was a theorem in the logic.
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Chapter 7
Reasoning About Security in Sensor Networks

7.1

Introduction

We present a formal framework for reasoning about security concerns in the context of embedded
sensor networks. We first provide an agent-based programming model for sensor networks. A
logical framework enables reasoning about security, safety, and integrity with respect to usage
of resources in this model. Embedded sensor networks often operate in rapidly changing missioncritical environments where both functional and non-functional requirements can alter dynamically
in an unforeseen manner. The network may need to be reconfigured and reprogrammed in response
to changes in its operating conditions. We provide a framework based on counterfactual logic to
formally represent changes to the system and perform what-if reasoning about their impact on
security and safety even before they have been applied.
Sensor network systems (SNSs) are distributed embedded monitoring and control systems that
receive percept streams from the environment and generate reactions that can be actuated through
actuators [25]. They often operate in rapidly changing mission-critical environments where both
functional and non-functional requirements can alter dynamically in an unforseen manner. The
system may need to be reconfigured and reprogrammed in response to changes in its operating
conditions. Since they are often deployed in mission-critical applications, modifications to SNSs
should be performed under utmost caution. Any disruption that results in system failure and/or
malfunction can yield catastrophic results. Therefore, we should strive to develop methods that
ensure that the correctness, security, and trust of SNSs are preserved even under structural changes
and reconfigurations in response to an evolving environment.
For many applications involving SNSs, requirements change dynamically in a rapid, unpredictable, and continuous fashion. In applications that drive search and rescue missions, any oper71

ational expansion/contraction requires dynamic reorganization of the system. In surveillance and
monitoring applications using sensor networks, nodes can die changing the network structure or
the environmental parameters can change requiring reconfiguration of the system.
We need to develop techniques, tools, and methods that help build, manage, and maintain SNSs
whose requirements keep changing during their life-cycle. Conventional software engineering
approaches used in industry are inadequate in rapidly evolving mission-critical scenarios since they
do not allow reasoning about changes arising out of dynamically evolving system requirements.
We present a formal framework for reasoning about security and safety concerns in the context
of embedded sensor networks. We first provide an agent-based programming model for sensor
networks. A logical framework enables reasoning about security, safety, and integrity with respect
to usage of resources in this model. We then provide a framework based on counterfactual logic
to formally represent changes to the system and perform what-if reasoning about their impact on
security and safety even before they have been applied.

7.2

A Programming Framework for Sensor Networks

In the context of SNSs we have created a framework for the development of secure sensor network
applications [6]. This framework is embodied by two main components. The first is the Secure
Operations Language for JAVA (SOLj) which is an event-based domain-oriented synchronous programming extension of JAVA used to write the specification for agents which, in this context, are
the software counterparts of one or more sensors. The second element is the Secure Infrastructure
for Networked Systems (SINS). SINS a is a distributed run-time system in which the SOLj agents
are deployed. The SINS run-time provides the necessary features that help uphold the system’s
security policies. Also, SINS can run both on the AndroidTM and Sun SPOTTM planforms. For the
sake of brevity we refer the reader to [6] for the details of other SOLj elements such as definitions
and the Secure Infrastructure for Networked Systems (SINS).
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7.2.1

SOLj - Secure Operations Language-JAVA

Given that SOLj is an extension of JAVA, it is presented as modular extensions to its core language.
A module comprises the specification unit in SOLj; it is composed of type definitions, variable
declarations, service declarations, assumptions, guarantees, and definitions. In the future we will
use the word agent to denote a module instance. A SOLj module may include attributes as they
are described below:
deterministic Declares a module that does not exhibit nondeterministic behavior. The compliance with this attribute is checked by the SOLj compiler.
reactive Declares a module that will cause a state change only when its (visible) environment
fires an event via a state change or by invoking a method. Also, this attribute denotes that
the module’s response to an event will happen in the next immediate step.
The type definition section contains user-defined types as well as enumerated types. The JAVA
comment //@type definitions precedes the “type definitions” section. It provides SOLj
directive to the compiler indicating the start of the type definition section. The variable declaration
section defines three types of variable which are explained below:
“monitored variables” variables in the environment that influence the agent’s behavior.
“controlled variables” variables in the environment that are changed by the agent’s behavior.
“internal variables” this variables reflect the agent’s state.
The JAVA comment //@Services precedes the “service declarations” section which declares the agent’s external interface. It contains the methods that realize the services the module
provides. For each method declaration within a service, the SOLj language provides the capability of declaring the corresponding preconditions and postconditions which denote the conditions
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under which each service should start and terminate. The preconditions and postconditions are encoded as arithmetic expressions and type declarations respectively. A type declaration is denoted
by a type judgement expression T:x where x is a variable and T is a type. These constraints are
enforced at runtime in a dynamic manner. Also, each service invocation must use a “continuation
variable”. This variable includes a boolean field called “done” which is assigned a value of true
once the service invocation is ready to provide a return value.
The //@Assumptions comment denotes the starts of the assumptions section which includes assumptions that determine the agent’s correct way to operate. If any of these assumptions
is violated by the environment, the agent’s execution is aborted. The guarantees section contains the agent’s required safety properties. The definitions section provides update functions which denote variable definitions. These specify the corresponding values for internal and
controlled variables. For the sake of future references, we will distinguish between monitored variables whose values are given by the environment, and dependent variables which are those whose
values that are the result of SOLj agents computations. These values are obtained using the values
of monitored variables and (possibly) past dependent variable’s values.
Based on the work presented in [6] we are fully capable of transforming well-formed SOLj
code (as it is defined above) and produce the equivalent JAVA source via a SOLj-JAVA compiler.

7.2.2

SOLj Events

Based on the Software Cost Reduction (SCR) method’s SCR Abstract Language (SAL), SOLj has
been provided with the capability of defining events [23]. Intuitively, SCR events can be interpreted as state changes. Moreover, the occurrence of an event is triggered when a variable has its
value changed. This is done by update functions which change the dependent variable’s value. In
the subsequent @PREV(c) denotes the value of variable c in the previous state. @T(c) denotes
when variable c changes from false to true. @F(c) denotes when the variable c changes from true
to false. @C(c) denotes when the value of the variable c changes between the previous and current
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states.
@T(c) =def ¬@PREV(c) ∧ c
@F(c) =def @PREV(c) ∧ ¬c
@C(c) =def @PREV(c) 6= c
An initialization method (init) assigns starting values to all dependent variables (controlled
or internal). Each module contains an init method. Each dependent variable is updated by just
one of the update functions. Moreover, a dependency relation is induced by the interplay between
update functions and dependent variables. We denote this relation with Dm . Let a and b be two
dependent variables, then we say that (a, b) ∈ Dm if and only if a is updated by the function
corresponding to b. The fact that a may depend on the previous values of other variables and itself
does not influence the dependency relation. Also, a dependency graph may be derived from Dm
by interpreting the set of dependent variables as the nodes and each (a, b) ∈ Dm as the edges 1 .
For each module, we need to consider its corresponding dependency graph as acyclic.
From a simplified point of view, a SOLj program executes in a sequence of steps and each step
is preceded by the triggering of an event. The module’s dependency relation induces the order in
which the variable updates and service invocations are carried out. Each computation step may be
decomposed as follows:
1. The environment or the agent itself triggers an event in a nondeterministic manner
2. Each agent responds to this event by modifying the values of its dependent variables
From an external point of view, the updates and service invocations can be thought of happening in a synchronous manner (as it is dictated by the Synchrony Hypothesis and exemplified
by languages such as Esterel and LUSTRE [21]). The latter implies that all dependent variable
1

The notion of a dependency relation is easily extended to the entire system.
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updates and service invocations that occur as a response to an event triggering, happen before the
next event is triggered.
The SOLj-based framework allows us to use a model-driven approach wherein agents are specified and verified at a high level and then compiled to JAVA code that can run on Sunspot or Android
platforms.

7.3
7.3.1

Example - SOLj Distributed Resource Access System
General Aspects

In the context of this example, the system will exhibit two types of SOLj agents. The first type is
a Resource Monitor Agent (RMA). This type of agent has control of a given subset of the system’s
resources. The latter is due to the fact that the Access Control List (ACL) is allocated to different
nodes in the system. The reason for the latter is to prevent single-point-of-control failures and/or
ill-intended attacks. The other type of system agent is the Resource Requester Agent (RRA). These
agents, aside from executing other specific tasks, use distributed protected resources in order to
carry-out their work. In this example we will only emphasize the security concerns while assuming
that the system carries out a non-specified set of functional requirements.

7.3.2

System Description

Our security distributed system is mainly composed of two agent types:
Resource Monitor Agent (RMA) This agent type is in charge of granting access to protected
resources. Each agent instance oversees accesses to a given set of resources based on
the entries of a given co-located access control list. The security concerns are distributed
and hence, a security agent may grant access to a non-local resource by acting as a proxyrequester.
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Resource Request Agent (RRA) This agent type has as its main task the duty of requesting access to the set of RMAs in the system. Its state is composed of the resources it is currently
using.
The resource controlled by an RMA are physically distributed and co-located with each RMA
instance. Also, the ACL is distributed as well. For a given RMA its corresponding ACL will
contain only entries related to the agents that have permission to use the resources it controls.

Figure 7.1: Distributed security system schematics
An example of an instance of a distributed security system is given in the diagram shown in
Figure 7.1. The SOLj source code examples for both types of agents RMA and RRA are given in
Figures 7.2 and 7.3 respectively.
7.3.3

SOLj Security Features

Based on the work exposed in [41], we explain how enforceable safety and security policies [44]
are expressed in SOLj as enforcement automata (also known as security agents [5], [41]). The
enforcement mechanism of SOLj works by terminating all executions of a program for which the
policy being enforced no longer holds. For reasons of readability and maintainability, we prefer to
use explicit automata for enforcing safety properties and security policies, although any language
that allows references to previous values of variables may suffice. Unlike assertions, where no
additional state is maintained, SOLj enforcement automata may include additional variables that
are updated during the transitions of the automata.
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//@Module Declaration
deterministic reactive module ResourceMonitorAgent
//@Type definitions
Permission = SecurityRecord
ResourceSet = OrderedSet<Resource>
AccessControlLst = OrderedSet<Permission>
//@Controlled variables
ResourceSet resourceList;
//@Internal variables
boolean usedResource2;
//@Monitored variables
%ResourceSet usedResources;
AccessControlList secList;
//@definitions
//@initialization
void init(){
%usedResources = null;
usedResource2 = false;
}
//@update functions
Resource grantResourceAccess(int requesterID, int resourceID1){
if(@F(secList.isInUse(resourceID1) &&
@T(secList.hasPermission(requesterID, resourceID1) &&
@T(!usedResource2)){
resourceList.getResource(resourceID1).setInUse(true);
return resourceList.getResource(resourceID1);
}
if(@F(secList.isInUse(resourceID2) &&
@T(secList.hasPermission(requesterID, resourceID2)){
if(!usedResource2){
usedResource2 = true;
}
resourceList.getResource(resourceID2).setInUse(true);
return resourceList.getResource(resourceID2);
}

Figure 7.2: SOLj code for the ResourceMonitorAgent module
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//@Module Declaration
deterministic reactive module ResourceRequestAgent
//@Type definitions
Permission = SecurityRecord
ResourceSet = OrderedSet<Resource>
//@Controlled variables
ResourceSet heldResources;
int agentID;
//@Monitored variables
AccessControlList secList;
//@Services
//@ Resource ResourceMonitorAgent:grantResourceAccess(resourceID)
//@
pre = !heldResources.contains(resourceID)
//@
post = heldResources.contains(resourceID)
//@Update Functions
void getResourceAccess(int resourceID1, int resourceID2){
heldResources.addResource(grantResourceAccess(resourceID1));
heldResources.addResource(grantResourceAccess(resourceID2));
}

Figure 7.3: SOLj source code for ResourceRequestAgent
The classical way of specifying the correct safe use of shared resources would be to write a
so-called class invariant, often specified as predicates on the “old” and “new” values of program
variables. Languages such as Eiffel [31] with explicit support for Design by Contract [32] include
constructs for specifying and checking such invariants. However, presently popular object-oriented
programming languages lack such mechanisms, and therefore treat class invariants mostly as comments, and provide no tool support to analyze them. A unique feature of SOLj is the ability to
perform such checks on existing implementations in a language-neutral manner.

SOLj Safety Automata
We show how SOLj agents are used to enforce safety properties. Within the example in Section 7.3
we show two types of agents (Resource Monitor Agent and Resource Request Agent) that cooperate
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in order to ensure that a set of distributed resources are used accordingly since no resources shall
be used by a given agent while it is being held by another agent i.e., an RMA will never grant a
resource that is already in use.

SOLj Security Automata
Another aspect shown in our example is security. In this sense, the security policy being upheld
is that an agent may access a resource provided that it has already been given access to it. If the
latter does hold at the moment of the request, access to the resource is denied and the request
has no effect. Furthermore, notice that a given resource can only be requested once, therefore, in
the context of two subsequent requests for a resource only the first one will be honored while the
second one has no effect whatsoever.

7.3.4

Source Code Description

In Figures 7.2 and 7.3 we have already given examples of an RMA and a RRA respectively. In this
section we describe the code presented in the referred figures.

Resource Monitor Agent (RMA)
For the purpose of this example our RMA agent manages a list of resources. Details about this type
of agent are given below. We describe each agent type by outlining the elements that comprise each
of the agent-code sections.

Type Definitions
Permission This type represents the right of any given requester agent to access a resource, assuming such resource is not in use. For this type we assume that a special kind of record
type (SecurityRecord) already exists.
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ResourceSet This type represents the group of resources an RMA controls. For this type, we
assume that a the type Resource, a native record type, already exists.
AccessControlLst This type represents the state (free/held) of the resources controlled by the
agent and whether or not a given agent has access to a specific resource.

Controlled Variables
resourceList This variable represents a lists which is used to keep track of the resources currently
in use and controlled by the RMA.

Monitored Variables
secList This variable represents a list that is used to keep track which RRA agents have access to
the set of controlled resources.

Internal Variables
The only internal variable for this module is isUsedResource2 which denotes if the second
controlled resource is being used.

Update Functions
grantResourceAccess This function takes as parameters three integers (resourceID1, resourceID2,
and requesterID) and does the following:
1. Waits (via event-triggers) until resourceID1 is freed.
2. resourceID1 is assigned to the requester provided it has never used resourceID2
indicated by the usedResource2 variable being false. resourceID1 is flagged
as being used.
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3. Waits (via event-triggers) until the resourceID2 is freed.
4. It flags resourceID2 as being used. If resourceID2 was never previously used
by the requester (indicated by the flag usedResource2 being false), the flag usedResource2
is turned on
The above security policy cannot be expressed in JAVA’s built-in security model that either
always allows access to a resource or never.

Resource Requester Agents (RRA)
In the context of this example an RRA, aside from other functional concerns, has the role of asking
RMAs access to resources. We will describe this type of agent by outlining the elements in each
one of its sections. We will not cover the Type Definitions section given that RMAs and
RRAs share the same used types.

Controlled Variables
heldResources This variable denotes a list which keeps track of the resources being used by the
RRA.

Update Functions
getResourceAccess This function calls the grantResourceAccess service on the corresponding RMA and updates the heldResources list with the requested resource.

7.4

Secure Counterfactuals in Sensor Networks

It is widely known that changes regarding security policies are, more often than not, frequent and
pervasive. System administrators always struggle to uphold the security concerns of the systems
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they help manage. The system’s security is under constant threat in this continuous change environment. Traditionally, changes to security policies are partially tested in a development environment.
However, these environments lack the scale/size that characterizes a live production environment.
The live environment’s sheer size may bring forth defects that were not captured during the testing
phase. The latter will surely mean that the ill-modified security policy will cause a non-trivial
breach. This scenario was mainly caused by changing the security policy. It would be useful to
asses the impact of a changed policy without changing the policy itself. It is in this setting where
counterfactual logic plays a crucial role.
Counterfactual logic aids us in what-if reasoning about statements that are not matter of fact.
Lewis [29] provided a sound and complete inference system and also showed that this logic was
a decidable one. We have created a logical calculus based on counterfactual logic. This calculus
allows us to express properties that would take place in a future version of a given security policy
and verify that indeed these properties would hold if the changes between the new and old version
were applied.

7.4.1

The Language of Counterfactual Logic

As it is shown in [29] we will shortly define the language that comprises the logic of counterfactuals
(pi denotes a propositional variable)

φ ::= pi |¬φ|φ ∧ φ|φ ∨ φ|φ → φ|φ  φ
The counterfactual expression φ  ψ should be read as: if it had been the case that φ, it
would have been the case that ψ. Therefore, if we had a statement that contained an antecedent
that expressed the properties of a given security policy and the required changes to create the new
version and the consequent expressed the properties that the new version would exhibit, then it
seems plausible that we can encode such a statement using counterfactual logic.
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7.4.2

Formal Representation of A Security Model

In this section we will define a simple variation of the Access Control Matrix (ACM) model. This
model was first introduced in [28] and [16]. We have chosen this model due to its simplicity and
intuitive nature and widespread use [28]. First, we will define three sets: S, O and A which are
respectively the set of : subjects, objects and actions. The set of subjects contains the active entities
on the system (i.e., users, computer systems, etc.); the set of objects denotes the set of entities over
which subject are allowed or denied a certain action. The set of actions denotes those tasks which
a subject can perform on a given object. Hence:

S

= {si }i∈I

The set of subjects

O = {oj }j∈J

The set of objects

A = {Read, W rite}

The set of actions

Thus, we formally define an access control matrix as a function M : S × O → 2A which
takes an ordered pair composed of a subject and an object and assigns to them a subset of the
possible set of actions. Moreover, in this instance we will have to work with M ’s intensional or
set representation and thence:

M , {(si , oj , αk )} where αk ∈ 2A
Encoding Change in the ACM model
Let M = {(si , oj , αk )i,j,k∈N } be the current version of the access control matrix. We can encode
the state of any ACM by using the following formula:

ΨM ,

p
m ^
n ^
^

(si , oj , αk ) ∈ M

i=1 j=1 k=1

We will simplify the latter expression using the following notation:
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ΨM ,

^

(si , oj , αk )

i,j,k

For the sake of simplicity we will define a change to the ACM as a change to the members of
the action-set of a given triple. Hence, a change may be represented as:

(si , oj , αk ) ⇒c (si , oj , αk0 )
Furthermore, let M denote the class of all possible ACM versions. Therefore, ⇒c can be
thought of as a binary relation over M and

M ⇒c M 0 iff M 0 , M [αk /αk0 ]
provided that (si , oj , αk ) ∈ M and (si , oj , αk0 ) ∈ M 0 . Moreover we define ⇒c to be the smallest
relation such that the following holds:

(si , oj , αk ) ⇒c (si , oj , αk0 ) iff:
1. αk0 6= ∅ when αk 6= ∅
2. αk0 6= A when αk = A
Undesirable Configurations
In any system, there is a set of undesirable states that the system should not assume. One of the fundamental purposes of any security mechanism is to guarantee that for any possible transition (that
originates in a safe/legal state) the target state will not be an illegal/undesirable state. An undesired
state will be denoted by a given configuration/triple of subject, object and action. Therefore, let
U ⊆ S × O × A be the set of illegal configurations and let τu range over this set.
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We want to avoid allowing a configuration change in which we enable an undesirable triple be
part of the new version of the ACM. Hence, we want to avoid the following:

M ⇒c M 0 where τu ∈ M 0
Secure Counterfactual Change
Our objective is to use counterfactual logic to let us decide whether or not a possible change to
the current version of the ACM implies that at least one illegal triple is part of the future resulting
version. Therefore our secure counterfactual implication can be expressed as:

[

^

(si , oj , αk )] ∧ (s0 , o0 , α0 )[α0 /α00 ]  (τu 6∈ M 0 )

i,j,k∈N

7.4.3

From SOLj to Access Control Matrix And Back

In Section 7.3 we have shown how a network of SOLj agents preserves a security policy expressed
via the assumptions and guarantees that agents satisfy. However, the security policy might need to
be modified in response to a changing requirement. Clearly, an arbitrary change may compromise
the system’s security. We have chosen an access control matrix-based model to express a system’s
security policy. We can derive the corresponding system’s ACM by statically analyzing the SOLj
modules. Then we use our counterfactual logic-based approach to determine whether or not a
given change would compromise the ACM’s integrity. If it is determined that the changes do
not compromise security, they are applied to the ACM. The changed ACM can now be translated
into a first order logic formula as shown in Section 7.4.2 and incorporated in the assumptions and
guarantees section of the SOLj modules.
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7.4.4

Kripke Version Model

In [29] the author provides the semantics of the counterfactual propositional logic using a possible
worlds interpretation. In our case, each ACM version will represent a world. In the following
definition, we write ti ← tj to denote that the tuple ti was swapped by tuple tj . Below, we provide
the formal semantics of the counterfactual implication based on a Kripke version model.
Definition 7.4.1 (Kripke Version Model) A Kripke Version Model R is a triple hM, ⇒, M0 i where:
1. M = {Mk }k∈N is the set of all access control matrix versions (ACM states).
2. M0 is the initial access control matrix.
3. ⇒⊆ M × M is a binary relation defined the set of all possible ACM versions. Where ⇒ is
the smallest relation such that the following properties hold:
(a) ti ← ti : tuple ti is left unchanged. This stands for the do nothing transformation.
(b) ti ← tj : tuple tj replaces tuple ti , where tj ∈ Mk . We usually call this primitive
transformation, a swap.
(c) ti ← tj : tuple tj replaces tuple ti , where tj , ti [α0 /α].
We assume that the relation ⇒ complies with the properties of reflexivity, symmetry, and transitivity. Below, we justify each property based on the latter definition of ⇒:
1. Reflexivity: For any ACM Mi ∈ M, it is obvious that the do-nothing transformation will
yield that any ACM can be transformed into itself. Therefore, Mi ⇒ Mi given that for all
tj ∈ Mi , Mi = Mi [tj /tj ]
2. Symmetry: For any ACMs Mi , Mj ∈ M any of the above transformations can be reversed
and therefore, Mi ⇒ Mj implies Mj ⇒ Mi .
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3. Transitivity: For any ACMs Mi , Mj , Mk ∈ M, applying two or more transformations to an
ACM will yield intermediate versions; this is equivalent to transforming the initial version
by composing the transformations into one. Thus, Mi ⇒ Mj and Mj ⇒ Mk imply that
Mi ⇒+ Mk . Where ⇒+ denotes ⇒ ◦ ⇒n−1 and n > 1.
7.4.5

Interpreting the Counterfactual Implication

Intuitive Interpretation

Figure 7.4: Lewis’ concentric spheres diagram in the context of our formulas
Based on the neighborhood Kripke model [29] Lewis provided an interpretation of the counterfactual implication. A counterfactual implication is true if and only if the antecedent is true at some
worlds and among these, the ones in which the consequent is true are closer to the actual world than
those in which the consequent does not hold. Additionally, in [29] Lewis states that he does not
attach any fixed interpretation to the notion of closeness or a distance/metric between the worlds in
his model. We precisely establish the notion of distance used in this paper. Let M1 and M2 be the
formal representations of two different versions as defined in section 7.4.2. We also identify each
formula (i.e., ΨM1 and ΨM2 ) with a specific world in our Kripke Version Model. Then we define
the distance between ΨM1 and ΨM2 as the number of changes (as defined in section 7.4.4) between
them. More precisely, if we were to identify each formula ΨM1 and ΨM2 with its corresponding
string, then, the distance between them would be the Damerau-Levenshtein distance between their
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corresponding strings. In Figure 7.4 we show that each world is identified with the formula ΨMi
that in turn corresponds to the ACM instance Mi .
Formal Interpretation
As it was stated earlier, the purpose of our model is to help interpret assertions in the language of
counterfactual logic. Let M0 denote our given initial ACM version. Also, let us assume we had a
counterfactual assertion, namely φ  ψ in which:
• φ stands for assertions regarding M0 and some transformation ti ← tj that implies that
M1 = M0 [ti /tj ]
• ψ stands for assertions regarding M1
Thus, following the model-theoretic interpretation proposed by Lewis in [29], our version of
the counterfactual implication is interpreted as:

R |= φ  ψ .

(7.1)

Where R denotes our previously defined Kripke Version Model. Moreover, letting αi , βi denote
statements about the structure of Mi and Mj respectively, then, we can state that:
n
^
φ , ( αi ) ∧ (Mi ⇒+ Mj )
i=1

ψ ,

m
^

βj

j=1
+

Where ⇒ denotes the positive/transtive closure for the relation ⇒. Furthermore, given an
initial ACM version, namely M0 , we produce several versions by applying one or more transformations to it. In the context of a counterfactual assertion, the current version’s structure and the
changes applied to it (in order to produce a new version) imply properties possessed the new version and hence:
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V
R |= φ  ψ , (∃min k ∈ N)( ni=1 αi )
V
∧(M0 ⇒k M 0 ) → ( m
j=1 βj ) .
The latter should be interpreted as there exists a minimal number of transformation steps such
V
that given the properties of our initial ACM M0 (namely, ni=1 αi ) and the transformation between
V
the two versions implies the desired properties of the future ACM version (namely, m
j=1 βj ).
7.4.6

Fragment of Counterfactual Logic

Given that we are striving to provide a mechanical procedure and a tool whose purpose is to aid
in reasoning about the properties that would hold for future versions of a given ACM, we define a
logical calculus which will enable us to infer such properties in a algorithmic manner. Thus, we
provide the set of inference rules taken from [29] and known as VC logic; these rules will help us
formalize our approach’s proof theoretical fragment. The soundness of these rules can be provided
using a model-theoretic argument that we omit here.2
1.
2.

` φ → ψ, φ
Modus Ponens
`ψ
φφ

Reflexivity rule

3.

φψ
Counterfactual-Elimination rule
φ→ψ

4.

`λ→ψ
Deduction Within Conditionals
` (φ  λ) → (φ  ψ)

5.

` (φ → χ) ∧ (χ  ψ)
Partial Transitivity Theorem
`φψ

7.5

Example - Security Proof Under Change Using Counterfactuals

First, we assume that all legal Access Control Matrices (ACM) are contained in the class M.
Furthermore, let us assume that U ⊆ S×O×2A is the set of all illegal tuples. Additionally, we want
2

In appendix 7.7 we give a model-theoretic proof for the Partial Transitivity Theorem.
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to emphasize the difference between the set representation of a given ACM and its corresponding
logical formula. The first is a semantic entity while the second is a syntactical entity. Our proofs
proceed by manipulating the syntactical representation of an ACM. Below, we define the class M
of all legal ACMs.

M , {Mi | Mi ⊆ S × O × 2A , Mi ∩ U = ∅}
Let the ACM initial version be M0 , the next future version be M1 , and let M3 be the next subsequent
version. Without loss of generality we base our proof just on two subsequent changes. Moreover,
in order to keep our proof short we will replace the following expressions:

(s0 , o0 , α0 ) ∧ (s1 , o1 , α0 )∧, . . . , ∧(sn , om , αl ) ∈ Mi
by their proposed shorthand equivalent:

^

(si , oj , αk )

i,j,k

In order to precisely define the change we need to give M0 ’s and M1 ’s set representation. In the
following, α0 ∈ 2A is the new action to be incorporated to the tuple (s0 , o0 , α0 ).
• M0 = {(si , oj , αk ) | 0 ≤ i ≤ n, 0 ≤ j ≤ m, 0 ≤ k ≤ 4}
• M1 = (M0 − {(s0 , o0 , α0 )}) ∪ {(s0 , o0 , α0 )}
Correspondingly, we also state the logic formula equivalents for M0 and M1 .
^
• ΨM0 ,
(si , oj , αk )
i,j,k

• ΨM1 ,

^

(si , oj , αk ) ∧ (s0 , o0 , α0 )[α0 /α0 ]

i,j,k6=0

In order to flesh-out the proof, we need to agree on several facts. First of all, we can (by
definition) assert that our initial ACM version M0 is not compromised (M0 ∩ U = ∅).
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Specifying Change
As it was defined before, a single change consists of renaming the third component on a given
tuple. For readability purposes change will be expressed as a predicate.

change(α0 , αk ) , (si , oj , αk )[α0 /αk ]
Moreover, we shall use this predicate to express change being applied to the current ACM version
as follows:

ΨMi ∧ change(α0 , α)  ΨMj
The latter implication should be interpreted as Mj being the resulting version if the change
predicate had been applied to the previous ACM version.

The Proof
In this section we will use the counterfactual inference rules (given in section 7.4.6) to deduce
whether or not a changed tuple implies a security breach i.e., an illegal tuple being included in the
new version of ACM. Let us assume that M1 , M2 , M3 , and U be defined as before. Firstly, we
need to take into account that ΨM1 ∧ change(α, α0 )  ΨM2 and ΨM2 ∧ change(β, β 0 )  ΨM3
are model-theoretic facts. Each ACM version can be thought of as a world. Moreover, the formula
corresponding to a given ACM version holds true at this world. Applying the change would imply
that the formula corresponding to the next version is true.
We want to show that a sequence of changes may imply a security breach. Without loss of
generality, let us assume that (s0 , o0 , α) ∈ M0 and (s0 , o0 , β 0 ) ∈ U . Furthermore, we will use the
following change predicates in our proof:

change(α, α0 ) , (s0 , o0 , α)[α0 /α]
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change(α0 , β 0 ) , (s0 , o0 , α0 )[β 0 /α0 ]
Our main intention is to show that if a sequence of changes had been applied to the initial ACM
version, then some security breach would have occurred. We may be tempted to allow only those
counterfactual implications that denote safe changes as theorems of our logic.
Claim : ΨM1 ∧ change(α, α0 ) ∧ change(α0 , β)  (s0 , o0 , β 0 ) ∈ M3
1. ΨM1 ∧ change(α, α0 )  ΨM2 (Model-theoretic fact)
2. ΨM1 ∧ change(α, α0 ) → ΨM2 (-Elimination in 1)
3. ΨM1 ∧ change(α, α0 ) ∧ change(α0 , β) → ΨM2 ∧ change(α0 , β) (Propositional Logic in 2)
4. ΨM2 ∧ change(α0 , β)  ΨM3 (Model-theoretic fact)
5. ΨM1 ∧ change(α, α0 ) ∧ change(α0 , β)  ΨM3 (Partial Transitivity in 3 and 4)
6. ΨM3 → (s0 , o0 , β 0 ) (Propositional Logic)
7. (ΨM1 ∧change(α, α0 )∧change(α0 , β)  ΨM3 ) → (ΨM1 ∧change(α, α0 )∧change(α0 , β) 
(s0 , o0 , β 0 )) (Deduction Within Conditionals in 6)
8. ΨM1 ∧ change(α, α0 ) ∧ change(α0 , β)  (s0 , o0 , β 0 ) (Modus Ponens in 5 and 7) 
By showing that ΨM1 ∧ change(α, α0 ) ∧ change(α0 , β)  (s0 , o0 , β 0 ) is a theorem of our logic
and considering that we asserted that (s0 , o0 , β 0 ) ∈ U (i.e., (s0 , o0 , β 0 ) is an illegal tuple), we have
caught a possible security breach that would have occurred.

Justification for Our Approach
The reader may argue that we could have applied the changes to the security policy and then used
some form of static analysis to verify whether or not the new version suffers from a security breach.
However, in the least risky scenario in which these verification efforts are done in a development
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environment, the developers and IT professionals need to materialize a new version. In the most
risky scenario, the changes are released to the production environment, possibly introducing a security breach in it. Therefore, it follows that our approach which only manipulates a representation
of the security policy will not yield the scenarios that we just described.

7.6

Implementation Results

We have implemented the proof in Section 7.5 in Prolog. In the following we will define the
predicates that realize the proof system.
matrix(Subject, Resource, Action) This predicate characterizes the tuples that comprise the system’s legal configurations. This predicate has been declared as dynamic which implies that
it can be changed during run-time.
prohibited(Subject, Resource, Action) This predicate denotes the system’s illegal tuples.
violation(Subject, Resource, Action) This is an utility predicate that helps us check the consistency of the security model, namely, it checks whether or not Mi ∩ U = ∅.
change(Tuple, NewAction) This predicate will change the current knowledge base as long as
Tuple denotes a current legal tuple in the system.
boxArrow(Tuple1, Tuple2) This predicate will change the ACM’s formal representation provided that Tuple2 is not an illegal tuple.
transformACM(Tuple1, Tuple2) This predicate succeeds when the change from Tuple1 to
Tuple2 implies that Tuple2 is part of the current legal tuples.
chainTrans(Tuple1, Tuple2, Tuple3) This predicate succeeds when the transformation between
Tuple1 and Tuple2 implies transformation between Tuple2 and Tuple3.
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We have modeled the security policies of the system shown in 7.3 as facts (knowledge base)
against which the chainTrans goal (shown as the first line in Figure 7.5) is verified.

Figure 7.5: Prolog run for the chainTrans predicate
Figure 7.5 shows the proof of the change that consists in initially agent a being given access
to read and write resource1 and subsequently agent a being given access to just read
resource1. We succeed in proving the correctness of the change; the two target tuples are not
illegal tuples. We have trimmed the call-stack by skipping the execution of the change predicate
which in turn just calls system predicates retract and assert. In addition, we verified the
impact of the following changes to security policies in the system shown in Figure 7.3.
chainTrans(matrix(b, resource3, rw), matrix(b, resource3, w), matrix(b, resource3, null)) Agent b is currently
able to read and write resource3, we remove its right to read resource3, and finally we remove all
rights to access resource3.
chainTrans(matrix(c, resource2, w), matrix(c, resource2, null), matrix(c, resource2, rw)) Agent c is currently allowed to write resource2, we remove all access to this resource, and finally we grant agent c access to
read and write resource2.
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chainTrans(matrix(a, resource4, null), matrix(a, resource4, w), matrix(a, resource4, rw)) Agent a is currently not
allowed access to resource4, we give it access to write this resource, and finally we provide agent a rights
to read and write resource4.
chainTrans(matrix(c, resource1, rw), matrix(c, resource1, r), matrix(c, resource1, w)) Agent c is currently able
to read and write resource1, we remove its access to read this resource, and finally we grant agent c
access to just write resource1.

All experiments were done on a dual core Dell Precision T3500 desktop. For the execution
depicted in Figure 7.5 and the executions of the latter four goals the time needed was negligible.
As stated in section 7.4.5, our formulas can be regarded as strings. Hence the proofs (i.e., goal
traces) are strings as well and we can quantify their length using character count (not taking blank
spaces into account). In Table 8.1 we show the length of the trace for each of the goals listed above.
Prolog Goal
Goal trace 1
Goal trace 2
Goal trace 3
Goal trace 4

Proof Length
3,165
3,274
3,227
3,199

Table 7.1: Execution lengths for the example goals

7.7

Model-Theoretic Justification for The Partial Transitivity Theorem

As it is stated in [29] the VC-Logic can be interpreted using models of index sets (these models
are a formalized version of Lewis’ model of concentric spheres). In order to establish a complete
context we re-state the Partial Transitivity Theorem (PTT) below.
` (φ → χ) ∧ (χ  ψ)
`φψ
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Since the VC-Logic is sound, the latter statement must hold in all models. In order to derive a
contradiction, let us assume that there is a model in which the PTT does not hold. Let this model
be denoted by:

S = {Si | i ∈ I}
Furthermore, as it is defined in [29], we identify Lc with the language corresponding to VCLogic and Snt(Lc ) with the set of sentences of this language. We let I be the index set of maximally consistent sentences. Also, let I : Snt(Lc ) → 2I be the interpretation function.
As it is stated in [29], we only require S to comply with the centered property, which amounts
T
to i∈I Si = {i0 } for some index i0 ∈ I. Additionally, since S is closed under arbitrary unions
S
we can state S ∗ = i∈I Si . We provide the interpretation of the sentences that comprise the PTT
below:
1. I(φ → χ) = (I − I(φ)) ∪ I(χ)
2. I(χ  ψ) = {i ∈ I | I(χ) ∩ S ∗ 6= ∅ → ∃S ∈ S(I(χ) ∩ S ⊂ I(ψ))}
3. I(φ  ψ) = {i ∈ I | I(φ) ∩ S ∗ 6= ∅ → ∃S ∈ S(I(φ) ∩ S ⊂ I(ψ))}
Based on the non-vacuous interpretation of φ → χ we can infer that I(φ) ⊂ I(χ). Correspondingly, a non-trivial interpretation of χ  ψ requires us to accept I(χ) ∩ S ∗ 6= ∅ as true. For the
sake of deriving a contradiction, let us assume that φ  ψ is false and hence its interpretation is
the empty set. Thus, the following statements hold:
• I(φ) ∩ S ∗ 6= ∅
• ∀S ∈ S(I(φ) ∩ S 6⊂ I(ψ))
Thus, we must accept that for all S in S, I(φ) ∩ S 6⊂ I(ψ). Notice also that by assuming
I(χ  ψ) as non-trivially valid and having assumed that I(χ) ∩ S ∗ 6= ∅ then we must also accept
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that there exists some S0 ∈ S such that I(χ) ∩ S0 ⊂ I(ψ). However, we had assumed that
I(φ) ⊂ I(χ) and thus I(φ)∩S 6⊂ I(ψ) for all S in S cannot hold since I(φ)∩S0 ⊂ I(χ)∩S0 ⊂ I(ψ).
Therefore, we have reached a contradiction and such model S cannot exist. Thus, the PTT must
hold in all models of VC-Logic. 

7.8

Conclusion

We have introduced a framework for formally addressing security concerns in sensor networks.
The SOLj-based framework allows us to use a model-driven approach wherein agents are specified
and verified at a high level and then compiled to JAVA code that can run on Sun SPOTTM or
AndroidTM platforms. Also, we have demonstrated that our counterfactual-based framework can
be used to formally represent changes to SNSs and perform what-if reasoning about their impact
on security and safety even before they have been applied.
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Chapter 8
Implementation Results

8.1

Introduction

In this chapter we show how the theoretical claims we have made thus far can be effectively realized
by our implementation results. Since our techniques were mainly proof-theoretical in nature, our
implementation relies heavily on theorem proving. We show that what was presented as manual
proofs in Counterfactual Logic can be represented as programs in Prolog. We show that source
code and security policies can be represented as asserted terms in a Prolog program. Furthermore,
we show that in both cases: source-code and security policies, simple properties (e.g, variable
bindings and legal-tuples) are preserved in two scenarios: the manual proof-theoretical derivations
and the implemented Prolog goals.
Many formal verification efforts provide manual proofs that give some idea about the proposed
approach’s correctness. It is not different in our case, since we have already provided proofs
that show how our proposed counterfactual approach can be applied to source code. However,
programmers and software engineers may lack the skill-set and resources (e.g., time, personnel,
etc.) to manually derive proofs that assert that their code is relatively correct in the face of change.
Therefore, we must provide implementation results and tools that deem our approach as effectively
feasible, i.e., it can be successfully realized by means of theorem proving.
We have implemented a proof procedure that guarantees the relative correctness of source
code using Prolog. We capitalized the strong similarity relationship between context-free grammar
production rules and Horn clauses. The latter relationship allows us to parse our source code also
using Prolog. In essence, the parsing phase allows us to transform the source code into Prolog
terms and assert them as facts. Additionally, we are able to express the source-code changes (e.g.,
statement swaps) in Prolog by manipulating the knowledge base of program terms. Additionally,
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we are able to express the properties that need to be upheld by the source code as Prolog terms.
Using all these elements we have reduced our manual proofs to Prolog resolution; i.e., given a
source-code fragment, a set of properties that the need to be preserved and a given change to the
source code, we can decide whether or not the change respects the properties after the change has
been applied. The latter implies that we can decide whether or not a given source code-change will
result in undesired secondary effects without changing the source-code.

8.2

Programming as Theorem Proving

According to the literature the Program as Proofs approach is not a far fetched idea. As it was
stated in [27], a given problem domain can be axiomatized (i.e., be represented as rules and facts)
and a given problem may be represented as a theorem (i.e., a query) that will be derived from the
proposed axiomatization. In this scenario, the syntax is relatively simple. Programs are composed
of sentences in clausal form as shown below:

Q1 , . . . , Qn ← P1 , . . . Pm
Each Qi and Pj is considered as an atomic formula whose syntax follows that of a First Order
Predicate logic atomic formula and we shall not cover here for the sake of brevity. The semantics
for this approach are given by two well known techniques: Resolution and Unification. Furthermore, our approach requires us to transform the provided source-code fragment into logical formulas. This is done entirely via Prolog using its Definite Clause Grammar feature which implements
parsing by deduction-approach presented in [37].

8.3

Implementation Roadmap

This section deals to with the task of using the Program as Theorem Proving approach to provide
an implementation for the code-change impact analysis method shown in section 4.5.
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Figure 8.1: System diagram for the code-change impact analysis implementation
The diagram in Figure 8.1 illustrates the road-map we followed to automatically verify that a
changed code fragment respects a set of future properties. In other words, we are able to verify that
the counterfactual implication between the change in the code (represented as a logical formula)
and the desired properties of the change is a theorem in our logic. Below we enumerate and explain
the steps depicted in the diagram:
Parsing The input to this step is a token list that denotes the program source-code. We use Prolog’s
inherent Definite Clause Grammar (DCG) capability to parse the list and produce a suitable
intermediate representation.
Pre-Processing The intermediate representation is then enriched with information (e.g. linenumbers, operators, and arguments) to produce the Prolog-terms which denote the logical
representation of the original source-code submitted in the Parsing step. The program terms
are asserted as facts in the Prolog run-time knowledge base.
Change The input for this step is comprised by the logical representation for the source-code
(derived in the latter step) and the properties that should be respected by the change (e.g.,
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variables bindings). More specifically, the change is represented by a swap or transposition
between two program-terms.

8.4

The Parser

Due to Prolog’s inherent DCG feature we can provide the grammar for our source language as
input to the Prolog compiler. The compiler transforms the DCG rules into standard Horn clauses.
Therefore, parsing is reduced to normal Prolog resolution. Parsing as resolution, a form of theorem
proving, was a technique first shown in [37]. This form of parsing is possible due to the use of
First Order Logic definite clauses to axiomatize context free grammars [37].
%Entry point for the parsing phase
parse(Source, Structure) :- alProgram(Structure, Source, []).
% Statement parsing rules
alProgram(S) -->
[program], identifier(X), [’;’], statement(S).
statement((S;Ss)) -->
[begin], statement(S), restStatement(Ss).
statement(assign(L,X,V)) -->
[L], identifier(X), [’:=’], expression(V).
statement(if(L, T,S1,S2)) -->
[L], [if], test(T), [then], statement(S1),
[else], statement(S2), {integer(L)}.
statement(while(L, T,S)) -->
[L], [while], test(T), [do], statement(S).
statement(read(L,X)) -->
[L], [read], identifier(X), {integer(L)}.
statement(write(L, X)) -->
[L], [write], expression(X), {integer(L)}.
restStatement((S;Ss)) -->
[’;’], statement(S), restStatement(Ss).
restStatement(void) --> [end].

Figure 8.2: First fragment of the DCG grammar
As it was stated earlier, we implemented the parsing effort using Prolog and its inherent DCG
feature. In Figure 8.2 we show a fragment of the DCG grammar. We can implement parsing via
102

alProgram(A, B, C) :’C’(B, program, D),
identifier(E, D, F),
’C’(F, (;), G),
statement(A, G, C).
statement(if(A, B, C, D), E, F) :’C’(E, A, G),
’C’(G, if, H),
test(B, H, I),
’C’(I, then, J),
statement(C, J, K),
’C’(K, else, L),
statement(D, L, M),
integer(A),
F=M.
statement(while(A, B, C), D, E) :’C’(D, A, F),
’C’(F, while, G),
test(B, G, H),
’C’(H, do, I),
statement(C, I, J),
integer(A),
E=J.

Figure 8.3: Prolog clauses corresponding to the DCG rules
resolution due to the fact (first stated in [36]) that parsing is just a constructive way of proving that
a given string belongs to certain context-free language.
We surely could have used any other language/software for parsing purposes, however, it is
undeniably more consistent if the whole effort was executed using Prolog-resolution. For example,
as it will be shown in section 8.8, for metric and benchmark purposes we only need to to look into
the depth of the search tree obtained by chaining the execution of the parsing source-fragment and
the counterfactual-proof source-fragment. In Figure 8.3 we can see how the compiler produced
standard Prolog source using the DCG specification shown in Figure 8.2.
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8.5

Intermediate Code Representation

The parser takes a list of tokens as inputs and produces the intermediate code representation we
use in later phases of the implementation process.
program e x a m p l e ;
begin
1
x := 2;
2
i f x > 0 then begin
3
y := 0;
4
write y
end
e l s e begin
5
y := 1;
6
write y ;
end
end

Figure 8.4: Example program
The DCG parser specified in section 8.4 takes the program shown in Figure 8.4 and generates
the following output structure (i.e, S).
S = assign(1, x, number(2));
if(2, compare(>, name(x), number(0)),
(assign(3, y, number(0));
write(4, name(y));void),
(assign(5, y, number(1));
write(6, name(y));void));void

Figure 8.5: Result of the parsing phase
The structure S shown in Figure 8.5 stands for the parse tree generated from the code shown in
Figure 8.4. The structure can be readily identified with a parse tree due to its nested structure.
The tree depicted in Figure 8.6 shows the explicit structure of S (shown in Figure 8.5). The
rest of our Prolog verification effort uses S as input.
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Figure 8.6: Parse tree that corresponds to the structure S
8.6

Program Terms as Facts

If we look at S as it is depicted in Figure 8.5, we can see it is composed of terms such as:
• assign(n, x, 5),
• compare(m, <, name(x), number(2)),
• write(s, name(x))
In the parsing phase each term (e.g., assign, compare, write) denotes the parsed pseudocode statement. In the subsequent phases each of these terms will be viewed as an un-interpreted
function symbol. This allows us to readily interpret each program statement as a term in Prolog’s
run-time knowledge base.
We transform S into program terms using the code shown in Figure 8.7. The stmtSplit
predicate takes S, a nested list of atoms, and produces a list of program terms. The resulting
program terms have the form f(n, <statement>), e.g., write(n, name(x)) where n
denotes the line-number in which this statement happens in the source code.
The code shown in Figure 8.8 takes a list of program terms (which should be already asserted
in the knowledge base) as arguments and produces the program properties relevant to the sourcecode statement that the program term represents. For example, the program term assign(5,
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stmtSplit((Stmt;Stmts),[Stmt1|Stmts1]) :stmtSplit(Stmt, Stmt1),
stmtSplit(Stmts, Stmts1).
stmtSplit(if(X, Y, (Z;Zs), (W;Ws)),
[f(X, if(Y))|Stmts]) :stmtSplit((Z;Zs), Stmts1),
stmtSplit((W;Ws), Stmts2),
append(Stmts1, Stmts2, Stmts).
stmtSplit(read(X, Y), f(X, read(Y))).
stmtSplit(write(X, Y), f(X, write(Y))).
stmtSplit(assign(X, Y, Z), f(X, assign(Y, Z))).
stmtSplit(void, []).

Figure 8.7: Prolog code that transforms S into program terms
y, number(2)) shown in Figure 8.5 produces the terms bind(y, 1) and asserts it as part of
the knowledge base.

8.7

Verifying The Change

We implement code changes or transformation by performing swaps between two given program
terms contained in the knowledge base. The later is done via pattern matching; each program term
has a corresponding line-number, the code-change is performed by swapping the line numbers in
two given program terms.
The code fragment shown in Figure 8.9 uses the retract and assert pre-defined Prolog predicates to remove the old program terms from the knowledge base and add the new ones. The new
state of the knowledge base reflects the changed program source code. Now, we are in position to
verify whether or not this new version of the knowledge base is consistent with a desired future
property.
We will use the source-code fragment shown in Figure 8.4 to illustrate how our Prolog verification code treats a simple example. The program in Figure 8.4 is mainly composed of an
if-then-else-block. The value to which the variable y is bound (i.e., 0 or 1) depends on the value of
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assertProgFacts([ProgTerm|ProgTerms]) :progCond(ProgTerm),
assertProgFacts(ProgTerms).
assertProgFacts([]) :- true.
progCond(f(_, assign(Var, number(N)))) :Val = N, assert(bind(Var, Val)).
progCond(f(_,
if(compare(>, name(Var), number(N))))) :bind(Var, Val),
Val > N,
assert(isGreater(Var, N)).
progCond(f(_, write(name(Var)))) :bind(Var,_), assert(isOutput(Var)).

Figure 8.8: Prolog code fragment that extracts the properties of program-terms
programSwap(Line_i, Line_j) :retract(f(Line_i, Stmt_i)),
retract(f(Line_j, Stmt_j)),
assert(f(Line_i, Stmt_j)),
assert(f(Line_j, Stmt_i)).

Figure 8.9: Prolog source-code fragment that implements the swap transformation
the input variable, x. If we had swapped the third and fifth statements, the variable y would have
been bound to an alternative value, namely 1.
In Figure 8.10 we show the Prolog code that connects all the elements we have explained so
far. The progChange predicate takes three variables as parameters; the first parameter, L, is
a list of program terms; the second and third parameters are integers that denote the lines that
will be swapped; the fourth and fifth parameters denote the variable and the value to which it
would be bound if the swap occurred. The first three predicates remove all program-facts from
the run-time knowledge base in case the progChange predicate had been run before. Then the
progAssert and assertProgFacts respectively integrate the program terms (e.g., f(2,
assign(name(x), number(2)))) and program properties (e.g., bind(x,2)) to the runtime knowledge base. As explained earlier, the predicate programSwap(Line1, Line2)
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progChange(L, Line_1, Line_2, Var, Val) :retractall(f/2),
retractall(bind/2),
retractall(isGreater/2),
progAssert(L),
assertProgFacts(L),
programSwap(Line_1, Line_2),
isGreater(x,0) -> bind(Var, Val).

Figure 8.10: Prolog code that verifies a binding-variable change
changes the program terms in the knowledge base by swapping the line numbers corresponding to
the terms. In this instance, we want to find out the binding for variable y if the we had swapped the
two statements. Therefore, we need add the predicate isGreater(x,0) bind(Var, Val)
to the set of goals we want to resolve.

Figure 8.11: Result for the resolution of the verification goals
The positively resolved goal shown in Figure 8.11 indicates that if we had swapped the third
and fifth lines, the variable y would have been bound to the value 1. We have to take into account
that this verification effort has not modified the source-code per se. What we have changed is the
program terms that logically denote the source code in Figure 8.4. The program terms are
indeed a simpler representation of a program if we compared them to their corresponding source
code. Changing the program-term representation is far less complex than changing the sourcecode.
The result depicted in Figure 8.12 shows how the change has affected the knowledge base.
The new version of the set of program terms complies with the proposed variable binding (i.e., a
desired future property) as it was shown in Figure 8.11. The results shown in this section prove
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Figure 8.12: Changed program terms in the knowledge base
that we can fully implement the manual proof shown in section 4.5 via Prolog resultion. In both
theoretical and implementation scenarios we have steered away from modifying the code. In both
cases we have found a suitable and simpler source-code representation that aids us in reasoning
about code structure, its meaning and possible changes to it.

8.8

Benchmarks

In this section we show how our implementation behaves in terms of several examples. This section
includes a set of benchmarks that will help us judge the relative efficiency of our implementation
approach. We have decided to use two metrics for our benchmarks:
• Proof length (in characters)
• Proof-tree depth (in call-stack depth)
The use of these metrics is heavily justified by the arguments made in [48] and, more in depth,
in [45]. The use of the first metric, proof length is related to the meaning of a Prolog program.
In simple terms the meaning of a program is the set of instantiated or ground-terms related to
the program. The proof of the program ranges over the meanings of it and thus, the size of the
set of ground-terms is proportional to the length of the proof. Proof-length is thus an adequate
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measure of the effort made to resolve the initial goal. Alternatively, we use the depth of the call
stack to determine the depth of the proof tree. Using the trace predicate we can follow how the
run-time tries to resolve a goal. The traced execution of a goal resolution is equivalent to a proof
tree; each step of the trace shows the selected goal and the variable instantiations/binding used
to resolve the goal. Hence, the maximum depth number reached by the call-stack at run-time
accurately describes the depth of a successful goal search.1 Below we provide the source code for
the different program-change predicates use to obtain the benchmark data.
progChange(L, Line_1, Line_2, TestVar, TestValue, OUVar) :clearKnowledgeBase,
progAssert(L),
assertProgFacts(L),
programSwap(Line_1, Line_2),
isGreater(TestVar,TestValue) -> isOutput(OUVar).

Figure 8.13: First program-change predicate
The code in Figure 8.13 takes six variables as input. After asserting the set of programterms contained in L, still respects the implication between the isGreater predicate and the
isOutput predicate. The programSwap predicate works as explained in Section 8.6.
The code fragment shown in Figure 8.14 acts on a set of program terms comprised mostly
on assignment statements (or the set of assignment statements of a more general program). The
set of bind predicates denotes the variable bindings the source-transformation affects. The precondition to this change is that the bounded values respect some ordering. The threeWayScramble
predicate perform a permutation between the program terms labeled by Line1, Line2, and
Line3. After the program-terms are modified the values are compared to verify whether or not
the ordering is still respected.
The code fragment shown in 8.15 takes a list of program terms, L and, OperList, a list of
comparison operators. After the program terms and program properties are asserted, we use the
1

All benchmarks were done on a dual-core Dell Precision T3500 dual-core desktop.
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progChange2(L, Line_1, Line_2, Line_3) :clearKnowledgeBase,
progAssert(L),
assertProgFacts(L),
(bind(Line_1, x, Val1),
bind(Line_2, y, Val2),
bind(Line_3, z, Val3)),
Val1 < Val2, Val2 < Val3,
threeWayScramble(Line_1, Line_2, Line_3),
findall(f(N,S), f(N,S), L2),
assertProgFacts(L2),
(bind(Line_1, x, Val1),
bind(Line_2, y, Val2),
bind(Line_3, z, Val3)),
(Val1 =\= Val2), (Val2 =\= Val3).

Figure 8.14: Second program-transform predicate
progChange3(L, OperList) :clearKnowledgeBase,
progAssert(L),
assertProgFacts(L),
getAllIfTerms(IfList),
changeIfStmts(IfList, OperList),
findall(f(N,S), f(N,S), L2),
assertProgFacts(L2),
verifyIfConds(OperList).

Figure 8.15: Third program-transform predicate
getAllIfTerms to collect all the if-program-terms from the knowledge base. The predicate
changeIfStmts applies the new operators (contained in OperList) to the list of if-programterms. We modify the knowledge-base (program terms and property terms) via the findall and
assertProgFacts predicates. Finally, the verifyConds predicate which correlates the new
comparison operators used in the if-program-statements with the new property terms that
were incorporated in the program’s knowledge base.
Table 8.1 shows the results of running several successful queries against a set of test programs.
We can see that the all three predicates are progressively more complex (they involve more inter-
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Prolog Goal
Benchmark 1
Benchmark 2
Benchmark 3
Benchmark 5
Benchmark 6
Benchmark 7
Benchmark 8
Benchmark 9
Benchmark 10

Proof Length
18,875
13,783
12,369
215,648
80,703
99,178
173,073
60,407
27,805

Proof Depth
15
15
14
36
18
18
21
16
15

Applied Predicate
progChange
progChange
progChange
progChange2
progChange2
progChange
progChange3
progChange3
progChange3

Table 8.1: Benchmark table for five different program-transformation queries
mediate predicates and modify the knowledge-base more than one time), therefore, for example
progChange2 will yield larger proof length counts than progChange would for the same test
program. We derived the proof-length and proof-depth metrics using Prolog’s trace predicate
which executes a query in a one-step-at-a-time manner. At each step the run-time system shows
which goal has been selected by the resolution process and the set of variable instantiations that
are relevant to that step. We consider each step as a level of the proof-tree. The step count for
the query’s trace is identified with the proof-depth metric. Additionally, we consider the character
count as the length of the trace. The trace’s length is identified with the proof-length metric. There
is a definite positive correlation between the length and depth of different benchmarks. We can
see that certain cases (i.e., benchmarks 5 and 8) the proof lengths seem to be outlying all other
benchmarks. Correspondingly, the depths associated with these benchmarks are also the largest
amongst all other benchmarks.
It is widely known that Prolog resolution (i.e., SLDNF resolution) has a worst time complexity
of O(n3 ). We assume that the unification that is done within the resolution task incorporates the
occurs-check) where n is the bit-length of the goal to be resolved. Such time complexity is usually
expected for theorem-proving algorithms. Although such time-complexity may yield unfeasible
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resolution times for programs that are exceedingly large, the proof-length and proof-depth metrics
can be seen as more descriptive of the size and computational effort that Prolog resolution requires.
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Chapter 9
Concluding Remarks and Future Work

The work presented in this dissertation dealt mainly with the problem of assessing the impact of
a given source code fragment in different contexts. The logic of counterfactuals has been a commonly used tool throughout all these contexts (sequential programming, general security, sensor
network systems, and security within sensor network systems). Although counterfactual logic may
be regarded as a non-traditional tool in the realm of software verification we have found it ideal for
the endeavor of performing source-code change impact analysis in an a priori manner. Given that
our approach is a relatively novel way of formally expressing change-impact concerns, we needed
a new kind of logic which enough expressive power to do the latter. The work presented in this
dissertation suggests that there is a new way by which change-impact analysis can be performed.
This new way of evaluating change is characterized by bypassing any modification to a source code
fragment, expressing the change in a formal manner, formalizing the desired properties, expressing
the source structure as a logical formula, and determining whether or not the formalized changes
follow from the desired future properties and the source-code structure.
In Chapter 4 we have applied our counterfactual logic approach to a sequential programming
scenario. We express the source code structure as a formula in our logic. Subsequently, we formalize the source-code modification as a program transformer, i.e., a second-order logical formula
which joins the source-code formula and the change formula and produces the formula corresponding to the new version of the program. Using two examples we were able to successfully prove
that the desired changed formal versions of two programs were theorems of our logic.
In Chapter 5 we adapted our counterfactual logic approach to a general security setting. We
took advantage of the up-front simplicity of the Access Control Matrix (ACM) security model i.e.,
the formulas that encode the ACM are simply statements about set membership. We formalized
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a given ACM instance and expressed it as a formula. In this instance, change was defined as a
modification in at least one of the tuples that pertain to the ACM. Furthermore, we model the set
of illegal configurations as a specific set of tuples. A coherent change is defined as one that does
not produce an illegal ACM i.e., one that contains at least one illegal tuple.
In Chapter 6 we apply our counterfactual logic approach to sensor networks. Due to the reactive
nature of sensor network systems we had to augment our logic with temporal logic operators
and temporal logic inference rules. In this chapter we were able to successfully formalize the
structure of the source code that denotes the parallel composition of a set of [SOLj] agents, express
the behavior of this set of agents as temporal logic formula, and successfully show that for a
given example system changing one of the code modules (agent code) would eventually lead to an
alternative desired behavior (also expressed in temporal logic).
In Chapter 7 we have furthered the work presented in Chapter 5 by using our counterfactual
logic to address security concerns within sensor network systems. We first show the inherent
security characteristics that pertain to sensor network systems comprised of SOLj agents. We do
this by showing that SOLj agents behave as security automata and in this case security policies are
expressed as transition invariants. Furthermore, we provided a concrete example in which a set of
resources must be used in a secure (i.e., an agent can use a resource provided that it has been given
permission to use it via the access control list) and safe (i.e., a given resource can only be acquired
once by an authorized agent and can only be successfully requested once it has been released from
its previous user) manner. We were able to prove that our counterfactual logic approach has enough
expressive power to express the security policy of the example system. Furthermore, we show that
a given change in our system will yield an illegal operating configuration. Therefore, we were
able to catch a security breach even before the change was in fact incorporated into the system.
The latter is very valuable in scenarios as this one were introduction of secondary ill-defects in
live-production environment will mostly lead to relatively large financial losses and even loss of
life.
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In Chapter 8 we showed how our theoretical claims made in previous chapters could be implemented via logic programming. We chose Prolog as a tool due to its widespread use on the
realms of automatic theorem proving. Regarding change-impact-analysis for source code, we developed a technique by which source code is simplified via a parsing technique which used Prolog’s Definite Clause Grammar feature. The input source-code was transformed in Prolog terms.
These terms comprised the knowledge-base which encoded the source code’s structure. Additionally, we use the program terms to deduce simple program properties (e.g., variable bindings,
if-conditions, etc.). These program properties were also encoded as Prolog terms and asserted
and complemented the knowledge base. Moreover, we modeled a source code transformation
based on swapping line numbers among two or more program terms. Based on the latter we produced four program-transform predicates. These predicates encoded the counterfactual changes
we theoretically proved in earlier chapters. These change predicates were used as goals which
always succeeded when the proposed change did not conflict with the properties that needed to
be preserved and/or incorporated. In summary, we were able to implement our theoretical proof
strategies using Prolog resolution for parsing the input source code and deducing whether or not
the source-code-transformation was correct.
In terms of future work we have recently discovered a very strong (and very promising) relationship between fragments of Monadic Second-Order Logic (MSOL) and automata theory. It is
already known that MSOL has enough expressive power to encode finite automata .We are already
capable of expressing a program’s source code as a second-order logic formulas. Furthermore, we
can identify the program source code with a string. This string along with some the usual interpreted function and relation symbols comprises the word model for the program’s MSOL formula.
Moreover, using our second-order logic program transformer notion we can produce a formula for
a second version of the program. The literature establishes that one can produce an automaton using the string’s word model. We conjecture that the transitions on this automaton may be decorated
with properties that the program and/or it’s second version should satisfy. Furthermore, it would
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be interesting to determine whether or not the MSOL formulas that denote the first and second version’s of the program can be satisfied by the same word model and hence the same automaton. If
the latter conjecture were to be achievable we could reduce the verifying whether or not a program
complies with a set of properties to the language-emptiness checking problem which is known to
be decidable.
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